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ABSTRACT 
Since 2003 language mandating civilian protection (POC) has increasingly appeared in 
Security Council resolutions, peace support doctrine, and humanitarian frameworks. 
Despite the frequency of its use, the term lacks a universal definition and a clear gap 
exists between military operations that attempt to establish, introduce, and/or enforce 
“civilian protection” and humanitarian approaches to POC concepts. This thesis posits 
three metrics that should be used to evaluate the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations 
which aim to establish POC: rates of civilian massacres, rates of internally displaced 
persons, and incidents of sexual violence. These criteria share both military and 
humanitarian priorities. They also represent elements of conflict present in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo since at least 1998, and each must be reduced in order 
to establish a minimum standard for civilian protection. The United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) was charged with implementing POC 
in the eastern regions of the DRC beginning in 2008. This thesis considers the ability of 
MONUSCO to address each of the three POC metrics and shows that the mission has 
fallen short of achieving its mandate to instill minimum standards of civilian protection. 
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War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has persisted at a brutal, 
intermittent pace for the better part of two decades. So too have international peace 
building efforts. These have focused on bringing the violent conflict to a close, restoring 
state capacity, and implementing sustainable democratic reforms. This paper focuses on 
work undertaken by the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Congo to fulfill one 
crucial aspect of its mandate, the protection of civilians (POC).  
The Security Council (SC) approved Resolution 1291 in 2000, creating the United 
Nations peacekeeping mission in the Congo (MONUC), which was subsequently 
renamed United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (MONUSCO) after approval of SC Resolution 1925 (2010).1 Since 2008, 
the MONUC-MONUSCO operation has been charged with the task of protecting 
civilians.2 It is just the second UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) authorized to use force 
in extending protection to civilians, and it is unlikely to be the last.3 Therefore, it is 
critical to understand what is meant by the concept civilian protection—a rhetorical term 
commonly employed by media outlets, policy experts, Non-governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), and the UN itself. Furthermore, it is necessary to know how to determine 
whether a peacekeeping operation fulfills its mandate of providing POC. What tools exist 
to test the ability of PKOs to implement POC? This question is asked because it helps 
frame a measurable hypothesis. Rather than attempting an impossibly broad investigation 
of the tools available to evaluate POC, and an even more contentious debate that attempts 
to finalize a universal POC definition, this thesis will consider aspects of the POC 
dilemma through the lens of a case study on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The 
                                                 
1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010). 
2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1856 (2008). 
3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003); United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1528 (2004); United Nations Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005); United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1769 (2007); Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of 
Military Intervention,” International Affairs 84, no. 4 (2008): 636.   
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central question of this thesis asks whether or not UN Peacekeepers in the country 
provide civilian protection. Does the MONUSCO mission meet its mandate and 
adequately protect civilians in the eastern DRC?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
The ability to protect civilians in the eastern Congo carries an array of policy 
implications at both local and international levels. Experts have shown that civilian 
protection is important because it is necessary to build any form of “sustainable peace,” a 
keystone for the development of any central government.4 This is especially true in 
Africa where civil wars have taken the lives of millions and state fragility leads to the 
cascading effects of poverty, displacement, and physical insecurity.5 However, there is 
little consensus surrounding the definition of civilian protection. This paper will therefore 
contribute to the growing body of knowledge on the capabilities of the international 
community to extend protection to civilians in so-called “failed state” environments.  
More specifically, this work should provide a valuable contribution to the study of 
the current peace operation in the Congo. First, by outlining civilian protection tasks, it 
submits a mechanism for measuring one of the most ambiguously defined, but arguably 
important, aspects of the mission.6 Second, it looks at recent data from the Congo and 
tests it against a set of metrics to evaluate POC effectiveness. In this capacity, the paper 
also supports work conducted at a policy level within the United Nations—if findings 
suggest the mission fails to protect civilians, experts should use this data to determine if 
recent Security Council resolutions that contain similar POC language are too broad.7  
Finally, the thesis also adds to the larger study of peacekeeping operations as it 
provides a definition for civilian protection that can be critiqued and compared to other 
                                                 
4 Victoria Holt et al., Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York: 
DPKO/OCHA, November 2009), 4–7. 
5 Paul D. Williams, Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa 
(Washington DC: National Defense University, 2010), 2–5. 
6 Holt et al., Protecting Civilians, 285–286. 
7 In addition to the DRC, ongoing missions in Haiti, Sudan, Central African Republic, and Liberia are 
charged with protection of civilians. 
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case studies. Additional research can analyze the utility of the definition outside of the 
DRC and measure its applicability to other PKOs. These broader lessons are important to 
the discourse on Chapter VI and Chapter VII peacekeeping operations and humanitarian 
intervention. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis advances the claim that MONUSCO has not extended adequate 
civilian protection to the eastern Congolese population. In doing so, it considers two 
opposing hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: MONUSCO has failed to protect civilians in the 
eastern DRC. Hypothesis 2: MONUSCO has succeeded in protecting civilians in the 
eastern DRC provinces.  
In order to test these hypotheses, this study examines the effect MONUSCO 
played in mitigating three criteria of violence that undermine civilian protection: rates of 
civilian deaths by militant attacks, rates of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 
occurrences of sexual violence. The selection of these criteria deserves further 
explanation and will be addressed and defended in Chapter II; however, three reasons can 
be succinctly summarized here. First, these criteria encompass both military and 
humanitarian conceptions of POC. They do not comprehensively address the 
humanitarian-military divide that complicates the task of defining civilian protection, but 
they do account for the core principles espoused by both schools. Second, the criteria are 
measurable. Recent research conducted by public health officials, medical experts, legal 
scholars, international monitoring agencies (including UN bodies), and political scientists 
provides sufficient data by which to test each criterion. A discussion about methodology 
follows and further outlines the data that was selected and omitted from the study. Third, 
the standards are applicable to other case studies. A spike in civilian death tolls, 
mushrooming IDP populations, and sexual violence are characteristic of civil war and 
protracted conflict. These criteria of violence can be measured in future case studies that 
contrast with the eastern Congolese environment. In conclusion, these metrics might not 
exhaust the definitional problems of POC, but they address major arguments presented by 
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both military and humanitarian communities. They are also easy to employ in the 
definition this thesis proposes for civilian protection, and their utility can be further 
evaluated in future research. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This analysis conducts a case study on the ability of peacekeepers to protect 
civilians in the eastern Congo—principally North Kivu, South Kivu, and the Ituri 
provinces. The case study methodology is appropriate because the universe of cases 
available to examine civilian protection in peacekeeping operations is narrow but 
growing. Historically, POC was not explicitly mandated in Security Council resolutions, 
but this trend has been abandoned in recent years with resolutions concerning women and 
children as well as conflicts in Sudan, DRC, and Cote d’Ivoire taking up the issue of 
civilian protection.8 To address civilian protection, the thesis first presents an overview 
of POC literature and then establishes a definition for the purpose of the study. The 
definition relies on the three criteria outlined above.  
Data for measuring these criteria are derived from several sources. First, major 
findings rely on epidemiological data examining the effects of death from violence in the 
eastern DRC that have been published since 2006. These include qualitative analyses 
conducted by medical researchers and public health officials, as well as studies conducted 
by major research universities and academic institutions compiling first-hand incident 
data. Second, statistics gathered by the United Nations contribute data on IDP and 
refugee populations, rates of sexual violence, and number of deaths per annum. Third, 
recent international trials and arrest warrants stemming from war crimes committed in the 
Congo have produced a set of legal case documents that are invaluable for their 
objectivity and statutory basis. Fourth, NGOs working in the eastern region of the 
country have published reports that contain measurable information about the effects of 
violence. This work includes initial assessments, population interviews, and qualitative 
analysis of the target population. Where possible, multiple sources are used to evaluate 
                                                 
8 S/RES/1590 (2005); S/RES/1769 (2007); S/RES/1856 (2008); United Nations Security Coucnil  
Resolution 1889 (2009); United Nations Security Coucnil  Resolution 1960 (2010); United Nations 
Security Coucnil  Resolution 1991 (2011). 
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the same criterion. To avoid sample bias, United Nations documents are not used as a 
principal source if another publication cannot be used to cross-reference an unorthodox or 
contentious finding. This is especially true of United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) documents. The potential for selection bias is 
substantial if UN documents are considered in isolation. However, it is worth noting that 
UN publications can be an equally valuable method of comparative analysis for studies 
produced by humanitarian organizations.   
A potential shortcoming of the project is that no research was done in country. 
Nevertheless, extensive demographic and first-hand research on the eastern Congo has 
been published in each of the operational topic areas identified in the definition.9 These 
publications are recent, peer reviewed, and highly credible. Moreover, they incorporate 
data from other fields, namely medicine and public health. In particular, these 
epidemiological studies improve the analysis of a crucial dependent variable, incidents of 
sexual violence, a crime that is often under-reported and difficult to assess, especially in 
the developing world.10  Additionally, the recent court cases of high-level officials who 
are accused of war crimes in the DRC provide invaluable insight because of their legal 
scrutiny and relative objectivity. Therefore, any data that could have been collected in 
country has been augmented by extensive research that is current and peer reviewed by 
leading experts in a range of professional fields. This thesis fills a gap in the literature by 
cumulatively assessing a range of POC factors to determine if MONUSCO’s 
comprehensive efforts to curb civilian violence have been successful across a continuum 
of POC needs identified by military and humanitarian groups. 
                                                 
9 Kirsten Johnson et al., “Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations with Physical 
and Mental Health in Territories of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,” Journal of American 
Medical Association 304, no. 5 (August 2010): 553–562; Lawry et al., American Journal of Public Health 
(May 2011); Vinck et al., Living With Fear: A Population-based Survey on Attitudes About Peace, Justice, 
and Social Reconstruction in Eastern DRC (Berkeley: Human Rights Center, 2008). 
10 Letita Anderson, “Politics by Other Means: When does Sexual Violence Threaten International 
Peace and Security?” International Peacekeeping 17, no. 2 (April 2010): 244–249. 
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E. DEFINING CIVILIAN PROTECTION 
Two levels of problems exist in regard to the problem of civilian protection 
conducted by peacekeepers. One is theoretical and definitional, pertaining to what is 
meant by civilian protection. The second is operational. Essentially, once POC is 
understood, how is it implemented by peacekeepers? What mechanisms can measure the 
success or failure of peacekeepers? This paper addresses critical aspects of both 
problems, first by proposing a definition, and then by using measurable criteria from the 
definition to test the success of the MONUSCO peacekeeping operation.  
Civilian protection is a seemingly straightforward denotation, but in actuality it 
conveys starkly different meanings to different audiences. Media articles often employ 
the term to describe violence committed against hapless and anonymous local 
populations.11 Security Council resolutions are quite clear that civilian protection also 
refers to humanitarian aid workers, especially those employed by the United Nations and 
international NGOs whose efforts are coordinated alongside MONUSCO.12 To address 
this divide, Chapter II explores existing scholarship that advances metrics for evaluating 
the effectiveness of peacekeepers and Chapter III incorporates these metrics into an 
analysis of the hypothesis and then analyzes POC, or its missing components, in the 
eastern DRC.  
This thesis defines “protection of civilians” as the prevention of civilian 
massacres, internal displacement, and systematic or recurring sexual violence in 
accordance with broader principles established in the Geneva Conventions and 
international humanitarian law. Chapter II substantiates reasons for adopting this 
definition, the most important of which is the incorporation of humanitarian language and 
operational tasks that should be employed by peacekeepers to mitigate violence. In many 
ways, the definition is minimal. This is purposeful because the language must correlate 
with mandates established in increasingly varied Security Council resolutions. A purpose 
of the paper—and a viable POC definition—is to elucidate the dilemma of extending 
                                                 
11 Alan Greenblatt, “Suffering in the Congo ‘Seems to be Anonymous,’” NPR, 6 April 2011. 
12 Katarina Williams, “Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo,” 
International Peacekeeping 12, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 507–515. 
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protection to civilians by peacekeepers. More specificity risks convoluting the study 
whereas this definition addresses operational outcomes of violence that are generally held 
to be unacceptable by both state militaries and the humanitarian community while 
remaining broad enough to allow for context-specific factors. Future research might 
address the universality of the definition by analyzing more case studies to determine 
whether these elements are suitable for gauging civilian protection in different operations.  
In establishing a definition for civilian protection, I admit an underlying 
assumption into the study, a POC definition. While this inevitably presents several 
problems, it provides greater opportunities to explore language and concepts increasingly 
employed by the international community, humanitarian workers, and various militaries. 
The unprecedented amount of resources and the civil-military efforts contributed to the 
MONUSCO mission present a POC case study that will benefit from another draft 
definition, rather than be obscured by it. A working definition also presents a point of 
departure for future research and fills a gap in the existing literature.  
F. OVERVIEW 
This thesis analyzes both civilian protection and the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Chapter II explores 
various interpretations of civilian protection. It posits a brief history of the concept of 
“the civilian” as a component of the Westphalian state system. In this review of the major 
literature that concerns definitional problems relating to POC, distinctions between 
military terminology and humanitarian language are outlined. This chapter also defends 
the definition for civilian protection employed in this thesis. A set of metrics proceeds 
from the definition, establishing a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of 
MONUSCO at providing civilian protection. Together, the framework and definition 
advocate a set of minimum standards for POC and commits to an underlying assumption 
about what is meant by the vaguely defined term.  
 Chapter III tests the hypotheses established in this project to determine whether 
MONUSCO fulfils its mandate to protect civilians in the eastern DRC. This is done by 
comparing the three metrics put forward in the working POC definition (mass killings, 
 8 
sexual violence and IDPs) based on recent reports, published academic articles, peer-
reviewed literature, and UN documents. 
Chapter IV summarizes significant outcomes of the findings with an analysis that 
explores operational and design difficulties of ensuring POC. Areas for future research 
are also identified. These are relevant to discussions on policy implications and 
recommendations presented in the conclusion of the chapter.  
 9 
II. HISTORICAL ROOTS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIAN 
PROTECTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature on post-cold War peacekeeping operations is extensive and has 
generally splintered into several camps. Scholarship on civilian protection is bit more 
focused. Broadly speaking, its divisions occur along humanitarian and military scopes of 
practice. Norms vary from organization to organization among humanitarian circles. This 
is also true across communities, governments, and numerous stakeholder groups.13  
Although UN Security Council resolutions employ the term “civilian protection” with 
greater and greater frequency, the concept is defined on an ad hoc basis—if at all—by 
peacekeeping operations. Further complicating the term, POC definitions outlined by 
military hierarchies typically differ from those adopted by the NGO community. In a 
review of NATO, UK, OSCE, and UN doctrines, Siobhan Wills, a POC scholar in the 
UK writes, “The approach to troops’ obligations with regard to the protection of civilians 
is far from consistent across the various doctrines.”14 Consensus is split as to whether or 
not this arrangement is beneficial.15 On one hand it provides an important space for 
humanitarian workers that is separate from militaries and combatants. It also complicates 
lines of communication and coordination efforts in spheres that are increasingly occupied 
by both actors. 
This chapter outlines major arguments in each field. First, it presents military 
frameworks for POC. Second, it traces the development of civilian protection among 
international institutions, including the UN.  Then, it synthesizes the critiques that are 
most useful for an operational understanding of POC, especially as it applies to the 
 
 
                                                 
13 Siobhan Wills, Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 66–81.  
14 Ibid., 79. 
15 Damian Lilly, “Peacekeeping and the Protection of Civilians: An Issue for Humanitarians?” 
Humanitarian Exchange Magazine 48 (October 2010). 
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ongoing work of MONUSCO. Finally, this chapter presents the definition used for 
protection of civilians in this thesis and defends its merits as well as acknowledges two 
potential drawbacks. 
B. MILITARY APPROACHES TO POC 
Military components of civilian protection inherently focus on securitized aspects 
of mission goals. That is, military definitions of POC are extremely task-oriented. These 
tasks include cantonment, patrols, de-mining, and the provision of security necessary to 
ensure travel, habitation, delivery of supplies, and a host of stabilization activities.16 Such 
duties, when compared with those fulfilled by humanitarian organizations focusing on a 
separate, but equally important, aspect of reconstruction obviate a disconnect between the 
goals of military forces providing civilian protection and the goals of aid workers striving 
for the same chief ends in the same environment. These endeavors are not necessarily in 
conflict with one another; however, when they elide at a tactical level, they are not 
always harmonized at a theoretical and policy level. In turn, this complicates how 
organizations define civilian protection, how they translate sector-specific language to 
one another, and how they coordinate in the field.  
POC is often understood from the perspective of what kinetic tasks a military 
force should carry out in order to establish civilian protection.17 Therefore, POC might 
include or precipitate security sector assistance (SSA) elements such as police reform, 
rule of law, and human rights protections. These SSA reforms are necessary to stabilize 
long-term civilian protection. Increasingly, they transpire at the intersection of civilian 
governance and military operations. Despite the need for functional civil-military 
cooperation, the two professions do not always work in simpatico, and the brunt of civil-
military failures are often attributed to military shortcomings. 
                                                 
16 B. Austin, M. Fischer, H.J. Giessman, eds., Advancing Conflict Transformation: The Berghoff 
Handbook II, (Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2011), 505–511. 
17 Victoria Holt, “The Military and Civilian Protection: Developing Roles and Capacities,” in 
Resetting the Rules of Engagement: Trends and Issues in Military-Humanitarian Relations, ed. Victoria 
Wheeler and Adele Harmer (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2006), 53–56; see also: “Report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo,” 17 January 2011. 
 11 
Reasons for this civil-military schism can be presented in a number of formats, 
and it is valuable to briefly outline two major arguments. First articulated over fifty years 
ago, they still inform today’s discourse on civilian-military relations. Classically, 
Huntington emphasizes the objective division between military and civilian functions 
where Janowitz advocates for an integrative professional military imbibed in the 
education, social, and political strata of civilian and military spheres.18 The argument is 
often described in purist versus pragmatist terms. Darrell W. Driver, an International 
Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a United States Army Colonel, 
reiterates the significance of the purist-pragmatist divide and its effect on POC strategy 
today. In his review of the European Security Defense Policy (ESDP), he formulates the 
divisions along these purist-pragmatist lines, arguing the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) will continue to struggle with POC 
duties because the Huntington-Janowitz division has only become more intractable in the 
last two decades.19 Recent debate in peacekeeping policy circles has not settled this 
argument—although robust scopes of practice in military doctrine, when operationalized, 
often favor more liberal ideas espoused by Janowitz than the realist model put forward by 
Huntington.20 For instance, a pragmatist approach to military doctrine helps explain the 
evolution from a purist conception of the military (one in which the military is only used 
to protect the state) to more dynamic roles in complex operations, stability operations, 
and humanitarian assistance.21 Recently, this has been characterized by “…the erosion of 
some traditional peacekeeping principles that have proved ineffective in the type of 
operations in which forces have been deployed, and also from the uncertain legal status 
of some interventions that have been undertaken without Security Council 
                                                 
18 Samuel Huntington, The soldier and the State The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957), 80–85; Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier: A Social and 
Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960), 417–420. 
19 Darrell Driver, “Pragmatic Approach to Civil-Military Partnerships,” per Concordiam 1, no. 4 
(January 2011): 12–18. 
20 Ibid., 14. 
21 Responsibility to Protect, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 
Ottowa: December 2001, 11–12. 
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authorization.”22 This type of deployment, described by Wills as the “uncertain legal 
status of some interventions,” refers to missions justified under the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) doctrine whereby civilian protection occasionally supersedes the rights of a 
state.23 This evolution in military and humanitarian schools of thought, which includes 
R2P and the expansion of humanitarian scopes of practice within military structures, will 
be taken up in the next section. 
Other authors comment on the integration of the military in the civilian world, 
recognizing that isolated military institutions will not build the international solidarity 
necessary for the provision of human security and the establishment of POC minimum 
standards.24 As modernization continues to transform global security dimensions, it is 
necessary that officers possess bureaucratic and political skills commensurate with 
civilians in order to achieve success in field operations.25 Janowitz cautions against using 
the military as a police force; however his constabulary model might be dynamic enough 
to incorporate peace-building operations into the purview of the citizen-soldier.26 
Peacekeeping and state-building require a complex understanding of civil-military 
relations. Adequate security must be imposed, but officers must also exhibit a degree of 
finesse and deal regularly with civilian bureaucracies, humanitarian agencies, and local 
populations. An officer with experience in the civilian world will possess skills useful in 
these cross-cultural operations that have both military and political ramifications.  
International and regional organizations, including the United Nations, pool 
troops and resources before deployment in peace support operations (PSOs). Because of 
the shared resources and multilateral troop contributions, mandates are often unspecific in 
their goals. Additionally, divergent foreign policies sometimes water down language in 
mandates or generalize rather than specify the function of militaries in providing 
                                                 
22 Wills, Protecting Civilians, 79.  
23 Responsibility to Protect, ICISS, 13–15. 
24 For example, see Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security 
Environment (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: 
Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005). 
25 Ibid., 3. 
26 Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 420. 
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protection.27 In regards to POC, regional and international organizations focus on 
preparation or pre-emptive kinetic activities. For instance, major reviews of POC by 
NATO have focused on civilian protection in disaster response and counter-terrorism 
initiatives.28 The African Union (AU) abandoned its predecessor’s non-intervention 
strategy and adopted a policy of non-indifference.29 This focus on planning and 
preparation without first giving adequate attention to a definition for civilian protection 
has undermined the historical debate surrounding the protection of non-combatants and 
the role of the military in providing security outside of specific security sector reform 
tasks. Before further considering recent doctrine, it is worthwhile to outline significant 
changes in humanitarian efforts to protect civilian populations. 
C. HUMANITARIAN APPROACHES TO POC 
1. History 
Civilian protection is generally considered to fall under the responsibility of the 
state. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, 
often called the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), builds on the earlier Hague 
Conventions (1899 and 1907) and admonishes state actors to protect civilians from 
atrocities of war—essentially, it reserves violence only for combatants.30 Furthermore, 
the Convention, its protocols, and legal critiques of POC implementation tend to place 
blame on the state, rather than the soldier, for POC violations. This is true even when 
operations are contiguous with civilian elements who might suffer from “collateral” 
violence. For instance, the inability of U.S. soldiers to distinguish between combatants 
and civilians during the Vietnam War is usually attributed to senior level policy failures 
                                                 
27 UN Press Release: Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 219th and 220th Meetings (23 
February 2011). 
28 “NATO and Civil Protection,” Parliamentary Assembly 166 CDS-06 E, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, 2006. 
29 Linnea Bergholm, “The African Union, the United Nations, and Civilian Protection Challenges in 
Darfur,” in Working Paper Series No. 63, Refugee Studies Center (Oxford: Oxford University, May 2010), 
8–9. 
30 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 12 August 1949. 
 14 
—criminality falls on the state.31 “The conclusion must be that the burden of 
responsibility for protection of civilians rests not solely with the combat soldier but in 
large measure with those who decide to prosecute a conflict in which a distinction 
between the enemy and the civilian cannot adequately be made.”32 This summation 
properly outlines the greatest difficulty of POC today: the nature of war in many conflicts 
renders a black and white description of the combatant and the civilian nearly impossible.  
To consider modern-day conflict, a phenomenon that has taken on particularly 
intra-state characteristics since the end of the Cold War, Martha Finnemore provides an 
important introduction. Without actually referring to the term “civilian protection” in 
Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, she synthesizes various conceptions 
of “humanity” since the 19th century. She shows that the development of humanitarian 
intervention grew from a narrow understanding during the Greek War for 
Independence—where Greek Christians were deemed worthy of humanitarian assistance 
and Muslim Turks were not—to a broad and universal appreciation for equality and 
human rights.33 Crucial to Finnemore’s constructivist argument is the normative 
development of the concept of humanity. The normative evolution of “the humanity” 
gave rise to the need for multilateralism as a tool to prevent human rights abuses and 
deliver humanitarian assistance to at-risk populations.34 Finnemore is a useful starting 
point in the POC study because she presages the dilemma of a definition and points to its 
importance for future research, in many ways drawing an indicator to the current gap in 
the literature on civilian protection. “International organizations such as the UN play an 
important role in both arbitrating normative claims and structuring the normative 
discourse over colonialism, sovereignty and humanitarian issues. Changes in norms 
create only permissive conditions for changes in international political behavior.”35 
                                                 
31 Richard Shelly Hartigan, Civilian Victims in War: A Political History (Chicago: Precedent 
Publishers, 2010), 5–6. 
32 Ibid., 7. 
33 Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention” in The Culture of National 
Security, ed. by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press), 162–164. 
34 Ibid., 181–185. 
35 Ibid., 185. 
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Finnemore declares that an opportunity exists for international organizations to expand 
multilateral efforts in humanitarian intervention—a prospect, not a mandate, for civilian 
protection. 
2. Post-Cold War Opportunities 
The post-Cold War era transformed the geopolitical map and opened new 
possibilities for civilian protection. As Finnemore advised, the end of bipolar global 
politics increased opportunity for multilateral arrangements. Additionally, the increasing 
prominence of non-governmental organizations strengthened capacity for civilian 
protection. However, the decline of interstate war and the spike in intra-state conflict also 
necessitated greater protections for civilian populations from belligerents as local groups 
often suffer the greatest threat from violence during civil conflict.  
A plurality of factors complicates such intervention. The two most glaring 
obstacles are the principle of state sovereignty and the operational capacity required for 
intervention. Violence stemming from the intricacies of these issues was painfully 
observed twice in the mid 1990s. The first was the Rwanda genocide of 1994 where 
800,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates were slaughtered. A year later, the worst instances of 
ethnic cleansing in Europe since World War II left 8,000 Bosnian boys and men killed at 
Srebrenica.36 In both cases, the UN cited concerns about both state sovereignty and the 
right of peacekeepers to prevent civilian massacres as primary reasons that the atrocities 
were not prevented.  
Even if the problem of sovereignty had been better managed, operational 
shortcomings would have confounded the likelihood of mission success. PKOs in both 
countries lacked adequate funding, resources, and political attention.37 In response to 
these institutional failures, the Canadian government established the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). In 2001, the body introduced 
                                                 
36 Holt, Military and Civilian Protection, 53–54. 
37 Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 11–12, 40; Robert F. Baumann, George W. Gawrych, and Walter e. Kretchik, 
Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 48–49. 
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the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and dramatically shifted the current 
discourse on humanitarian intervention and peace support operations (PSO). 
Responsibility to Protect transformed peacekeeping operations and humanitarian 
intervention because it challenged traditional conceptions about sovereignty and the state. 
Introduced to the General Assembly in 2005 and unanimously endorsed by all members 
of the Security Council in 2006, R2P advanced the claim that while states have rights, 
they also have obligations.38 This constructivist notion breaks from the theoretical 
foundation that the state is primary to the individual and asserts that the ideal of human 
rights is on par with the principle of state sovereignty, or at least not secondary to it.39 It 
builds on preceding generations of Hague and Geneva conventions and advocates the 
position that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in a timely 
fashion to prevent genocide and other human rights atrocities if a state is unwilling or 
unable to do so. Instances that would require international intervention include: genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.40  
Several problems with R2P implementation remain unresolved. A major 
complication is predictability. What warning mechanism will foresee the next genocide, 
and will states adhere to its predictions? In addition to the problem of anticipation, R2P 
proposes a sweeping agenda. Its aspiration to provide universal protection to suffering 
civilian populations is extremely ambitious. The potential for intervention is not only 
great, but its interpretation is likely to vary from country to country. “The moral ideals of 
treating all harms to civilians equally, of being willing to respond to the most serious 
abuses with force (both for effect and a sense of justice), and of extending the legitimate 
rule of a state are not likely to all point in the same direction.”41  
Furthermore, R2P is clear about the expeditious requirement of effective 
prevention: belligerents must not carry out war crimes. How can this be operationalized? 
                                                 
38 Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military Intervention,” 
International Affairs 84, no. 4 (2008): 615–19. 
39 Responsibility to Protect, ICISS, 2–14. 
40 Ibid.,33.  
41 Daniel H. Levine, “Civilian Protection and the Image of the ‘Total Spoiler’: Reflections on 
MONUC Support to Kimia,” CISSM Working Paper (October 2010): 16. 
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Time is a crucial variable. Is a standing, international reserve force necessary to the 
doctrine’s success? R2P obviously expands some of the major complications associated 
with civilian protection; however, it does not account for many of its operational 
difficulties, and perhaps it creates more of them. 
One prospect for addressing the R2P debate is simply to acknowledge the 
influence the doctrine has had on both the theory and rhetoric that surrounds peace 
operations and humanitarian intervention. From the highest echelons of the Secretariat 
and the Security Council to the most junior peacekeeper in the field, the phrase 
“responsibility to protect” permeates the discourse. This shows a marked evolution in 
PKO theory.42 Regardless of the legality of the principle, or the ability of the UN and 
international community to uphold and implement its idyllic standards, we very much 
live in a post-R2P world. 
D. CURRENT DEFINITION DEBATES 
The previous section briefly considered the early development of humanitarian 
norms and observed very general components of the civilian-military divide. It is now 
possible to further explore the division between the two communities by looking at their 
attempts to define civilian protection. This is accomplished by a discussion of military 
doctrine on PSOs followed by an analysis of frameworks put forward by various 
humanitarian agencies. Finally, efforts undertaken by the United Nations, especially the 
DPKO, to address civilian protection are analyzed. 
1. Military Definitions 
The POC problem is exacerbated by the near total absence of a definition for 
civilian protection in state military structures. Most states do not define POC. However, 
since at least 2000, many have designated considerable attention to “peace support 
                                                 
42 Roger Cohen, “African Genocide Averted,” New York Times 7 March 2007; see also Bellamy, 
“Responsibility to Protect,” 615- 617. 
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operations.”43 Often this has appeared in the form of new doctrine. Regional 
organizations have also undertaken doctrinal reviews of PSOs. To date, PSO doctrine 
falls short of clarifying civilian protection, but it is useful for cohering the effects that 
recent developments in R2P have had on humanitarian intervention in theory and the 
observable changes in POC efforts for victims of violence.  
To address humanitarian intervention and other non-traditional operations, the 
United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MOD) published the Joint Warfare Publication 3–
50 (JWP 3–50) in 2004. It defines a peace support operation as: 
An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil, and military 
means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and 
principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations include conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or 
humanitarian operations.44 
The Joint Warfare Publication outlines the UK program for peacekeeping operations. 
Because they are often domestic responses to UN initiatives, these missions increasingly 
call for civilian protection. Unfortunately, the term “civilian protection” does not appear 
in the doctrine. In fact, the MOD concludes that looseness in interpretation will benefit 
military actors. “Flexibility is required to avoid actors’ thinking being unnecessarily 
constrained by terminology.”45  
While the creative faculties that a “flexibility” in terminology might produce 
appear useful at first glance, the omission of a POC definition has had disastrous 
consequences in the past. For example, the number of fatalities suffered by 
noncombatants in Rwanda, Sudan and the DRC number in the hundreds of thousands. In 
each case, civilian protection was called for, but not defined by, UN peacekeeping 
                                                 
43 The most concise outline for a peace support operation was provided by Major General Wilson of 
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operations.46 A PSO supports UN peacekeeping missions and therefore relies on Security 
Council resolutions to outline the scope of an operation and its definitional terms. 
Without an agreed upon definition from the Security Council or the JWP-350, the UK 
lacks adequate structure and guidance for protecting civilians.  
On the whole, African militaries also struggle to define civilian protection. This is 
not surprising as many of the resolutions that call for POC do so in African countries with 
UN peacekeeping missions. Nevertheless, as a regional body, the African Union has 
made significant strides in internalizing its response to acts of genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and the subsequent debates surrounding Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine. The AU policy evolved from a practice of non-intervention, an idea 
popular in the Organization for African Unity (OAU), to the principle of non-
indifference.47 Like Finnemore’s theories about developments in humanitarian 
intervention, non-indifference is the result of normative institutional adaptations from an 
antiquated framework of human rights.  
In light of atrocities witnessed in Darfur, the Congo, and Somalia, changes in AU 
norms now champion the cause of civilian protection.48 The non-indifference principle 
does not clarify the more difficult questions about POC, especially issues about when 
intervention becomes necessary. Because of this operational problem, the organization 
has met with failure in trying to prevent civilian casualties in countries like Zimbabwe.49 
However, AU leaders point to recent success the organization has had in curbing 
widespread violence on the continent. Examples include missions in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Burundi, and, with relative levels of success, Sudan.50 More recently, the 
permissive stance of the AU towards international efforts to remove former President 
Laurent Gbago from power in Cote D’Ivoire highlight the gradual transition from non-
intervention to non-indifference. These trends will continue to expand normative 
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47 Bergholm, “The African Union,” 8–9. 
48 Ibid., 22. 
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understanding of humanitarian concepts and will increase the awareness of and protection 
for civilian populations. Codifying terminology will further clarify the non-indifference 
strategy and reduce response times to vulnerable populations. 
2. Humanitarian Definitions 
Definitions for civilian protection differ widely in the humanitarian world, and, 
contrary to DPKO and AU definitions, they are almost never designated on an ad hoc 
basis. They align with organizational values and missions—beliefs held by humanitarian 
professionals to be more important than mission-specific tasks. Similar to military 
doctrine, the work of civilian protection does have tactical, real-world ramifications and 
can be formalized into activities, projects or tasks. For example, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) understands protection as a range of activities that 
seek to affect the causes, not the outcomes, of abuses and violations of international 
humanitarian law.51 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
focuses on the access of boys, girls, and women to fundamental human rights, including 
the ability to “rebuild” their livelihoods.52 United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and 
Save the Children both emphasize freedom from violence and exploitation while 
Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF) adds to this list the freedom from willful and deliberate 
neglect.53 Finally, humanitarian approaches to POC rely more on international 
humanitarian law than state or military doctrine.54 Despite the differences in agency 
approach, a general summary of humanitarian concerns is that they revolve around the 
elimination of acute harm and suffering. Similar to pragmatic military operations, they 
maintain the over-arching goal of improved human security. 
In place of a singular definition, professionals in the humanitarian community 
often find consensus around the “egg model” or “egg framework” developed for 
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preventative action by the ICRC.55 The egg model establishes three types of activity that 
require expert collaboration in order to protect civilians: responsive action, remedial 
action, and environment building. Responsive action relates to an immediate crisis or 
emergency, such as disarming child soldiers. Remedial action takes up the task of 
eliminating patterns of abuse and responds to long-term support needs, such as the 
restoration of dignity, family planning, psychological, economic, and social forms of 
rehabilitation. Environment building concerns broad, interagency goals that transform 
both the lifestyles and geographies of those plagued with conflict and instability into 
positive forms of peace by upholding the rule of law.56 In many ways the IDP Handbook 
is a comprehensive source for POC in the humanitarian world. However, an obvious 
problem in its application to peacekeeping operations is a model that accounts for 
interagency collaboration among NGOs, but not international peacekeepers. 
Paul Williams, a professor whose research focuses on national defense, African 
security, and integrative peacekeeping operations, contributes what might be a more 
useful model for civilian protection with his “onion” framework. He encourages a 
multilayered understanding of POC, with security from physical violence as the most 
basic level of protection, and the enjoyment of human rights and even greater social and 
economic “enabling conditions” as optimal forms of protection. In total, Williams 
suggests four such layers of protection: physical protection from imminent violence (the 
most necessary and urgent condition), provision of basic necessities, enjoyment of human 
rights, and enabling conditions (the broadest interpretation of POC).57 His 
recommendation is useful because, though it accounts for a wide spectrum of protective 
action, it is more specific than the egg model and is therefore more suitable for 
application to various peacekeeping operations. However, a shortcoming of Williams’ 
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model is that it too remains nebulous. For instance, specificity about displaced 
populations is not adequately addressed by either the provision of basic necessities or the 
removal of physical threat from violence.  
3. United Nations Definitions 
POC language initially appeared in Security Council resolutions when the first 
mandate to provide civilian protection was passed by the SC, outlining the mission in 
Sierra Leone.58 Several months earlier, in September 1999, the SC had unanimously 
passed Resolution 1265, expressing a “willingness” to extend civilian protection “to 
situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted or where humanitarian 
assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed.” The resolution also noted the 
need to protect refugees and internally displaced persons and those aid workers providing 
humanitarian assistance to non-combatants.59 International coverage of the massive 
civilian casualties in Darfur, in conjunction with the adoption of R2P at the 2005 World 
Summit, attracted more attention to the topic and provoked extensive work by 
humanitarian experts at the UN to focus on outlining POC tasks.60 Despite these early 
efforts, the SC has never defined civilian protection.61 Because one is yet to be codified, 
a recent trend in the scholarship has been to point fingers at the Security Council and the 
Secretariat for failing to establish a POC definition while continuing to call for its 
implementation in peacekeeping mandates. 
To its credit, the Security Council passed Resolution 1674 in 2006, reaffirming 
the Responsibility to Protect and condemning attacks on civilians by belligerents.62 More 
recently, the Council passed several resolutions that focus on the role of sexual violence 
in war and the establishment of mechanisms to prevent and monitor human rights abuses 
carried out by armed combatants. Due in part to atrocities committed in the DRC and 
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Sudan, the Council approved a string of thematic resolutions between 2008 and 2010 
addressing particular aspects of POC, such as sexual violence and the protection of 
children in conflict.63 While the specific nature of these resolutions provides some clarity 
into the meaning of civilian protection, none actually attempt a definition; nor do they 
prescribe measurable and operational reference points for peacekeepers in the field. For 
the Security Council, the issue of a POC definition is entirely unresolved, ad hoc, and 
open-ended. 
The DPKO is responsible for its own share of buck-passing. For instance, the 
2008 capstone document, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 
Guidelines, repeatedly references the need to protect civilians—among many other 
tasks—but does not offer an explanation of POC or monitoring mechanisms for PKs in 
the field.64 This is not surprising given that only in recent years has the DPKO been 
handed such broad and sweeping mandates by the SC. Indeed, for most of the DPKO’s 
history it answered to the early peacekeeping virtues of impartiality and neutrality. The 
imposition of peace is relatively new territory for the organization. Recognizing this 
horizon for PKOs, it is worth returning to the conclusions drawn by Finnemore:  
“One important task of future research will be to define more specifically 
the conditions under which certain kinds of norms might prevail or fail in 
influencing action. A related task will be to clarify the mechanisms 
whereby norms are created, changed and exercise their influence…More 
detailed study of individual cases is needed to clarify the role of each of 
these mechanisms.”65  
As Finnemore predicted, public opinion, the media and international institutions struggle 
in a contemporary balancing act to address the permissive norm challenge posed by 
civilian protection. This paper answers her call for more case studies and contributes to 
the body of knowledge on PKOs and civilian protection. 
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E. PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS DEFINED 
1. Definition 
For the purpose of this thesis, civilian protection is defined as the prevention of 
civilian massacres, internal displacement, and systematic or recurring sexual violence in 
accordance with broader principles established in the Geneva Conventions and 
international humanitarian law. This definition incorporates humanitarian language and 
thereby reaffirms the most fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. It 
also includes thematic aspects of recent UN resolutions on the rights of individuals in 
conflict. These include civilian protection, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), 
and displacement.  
As already acknowledged, the definition is minimal. This serves the purpose of 
acknowledging the most gruesome human rights violations perpetrated during a PKO 
without holding missions accountable for divergent state doctrines and the absence of an 
internationally accepted understanding of POC. The purpose of the paper—and a viable 
POC definition—is to elucidate the dilemma of extending protection to civilians by 
peacekeepers. This chapter suggests that general consensus in humanitarian and military 
circles has emerged in recent years around the premise that civilian protection should 
ensure freedom from acute harm and uphold general standards of human security. The 
three factors in this definition expand human security and aim to reduce or minimize the 
most caustic forms of suffering that are often present in war. Having settled a standard for 
protection, the remainder of this thesis considers whether MONUSCO has achieved 
success delivering POC, and which factors contributed or detracted from the PKO’s 
successful ability to meet its POC mandate. 
2. Potential drawbacksinsert tab after all heading numbers 
A final note should be made about two potential drawbacks to the definition. The 
first is the inclusion of sexual violence. Civilians can be harmed without incidents of 
gender-based sexual violence. Furthermore, SGBV is extremely difficult to evaluate and 
monitor, leading to greater likelihoods of sample errors in population-based studies. 
Determining when SGBV has become a systematic tool of war is perhaps most difficult 
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to prove. Despite these problems, human rights experts point out the dire need to 
investigate accusations of sexual violence. In recent years the Security Council and the 
Secretariat have reinforced this notion: in 2008, the SC passed the landmark Resolution 
1820 on the protection of women from sexual violence in conflict, and Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon recently appointed Margot Wallstrom as Special Representative on sexual 
violence in conflict.66 Additionally, sexual violence is particularly problematic in the 
eastern DRC and an important factor to address if “enabling conditions” for peace are 
sought by peacekeepers, development professionals, and the international community. 
An additional criticism that might be levied against the definition is the lack of 
specific reference to recent doctrine, especially R2P. However, as this chapter 
demonstrated, implementation of Responsibility to Protect is not without controversy. 
This is largely because the doctrine places the onus of humanitarian responsibility on the 
state. Case studies of successful implementation do not exist and cannot be used against 
which to test a thesis. Therefore, this definition accounts for three important, or “acute,” 
variables but remains general enough to evaluate future case conflicts. 
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III. HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The argument put forward in this thesis is that MONUSCO has failed to protect 
civilians in the eastern DRC. According to the definition advanced earlier in this study, 
POC can be determined on the basis of three factors: civilian massacres, sexual violence, 
and internal displacement. These three criteria identify the most acute forms of suffering 
present in wartime societies while unifying literature of both the humanitarian 
community and 21st century military doctrine. This chapter will test the hypothesis by 
examining each of the three POC measures. Sources comprise a comprehensive survey of 
the most recent, peer-reviewed analyses of the three measurable POC factors. These are 
complemented by news articles, reports published by monitoring groups, and internal UN 
agency reports—all of which examine the conflict in the years since the Security Council 
prioritized POC in the MONUSCO mandate. The first section of this chapter provides 
general background about the major armed groups in the eastern DRC. The proceeding 
three sections test the hypothesis by analyzing rates of civilian massacres, prevalence of 
sexual violence, and IDP statistics. The summary of findings shows that MONUSCO has 
failed to protect civilians according to these standards. 
B.  STATE MILITARY, AND ARMED GROUPS IN THE DRC 
An evaluation of the three metrics considered in this thesis requires a brief 
overview of the major armed groups in the eastern DRC. A summary of conflict agents in 
the region is inevitably incomplete for a variety of reasons. Resources, land rights, and 
economic motivations also alter the kinetic capabilities of rebel groups—as weapons 
caches are lost or acquired and natural resources are gained or forfeited, the dynamics of 
conflict change, as does their effects on the civilian population.67 The fealty of militia 
units corresponds accordingly. Integration efforts are often incomplete and combatants 
that are demobilized from a militia group before being reintegrated into the state military 
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do not always adhere to acceptable standards of military professionalism, or even loyalty 
to the state. Finally, the dense jungle and remoteness of the eastern region, hundreds of 
miles from Kinshasa’s central government, renders the cohesion of armed groups 
sporadic at best.  
The following overview cannot account for such continually shifting alliances and 
arrangements across multiple armed groups; however, it does present general 
monographs of the most significant military elements in the region in order to better 
understand their involvement in the factors of instability that undermine POC. The 
significant combatant groups include: the state’s official military, the Armed Forces of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC); the Democratic Forces for the Liberation 
of Rwanda (FDLR); National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP); and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Other agents of conflict certainly perpetuate insecurity 
in the eastern DRC, but these are the most identifiable and disruptive actors.  
1. Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC)  
Current estimates about the size of the state military, the Armed Forces of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), vary widely. In 2007, it consisted of nearly 
165,000 soldiers, of which approximately 30,000 were “shadows” on the payroll, 
probably representing double payments made to corrupt commanders.68 Efforts to disarm 
and demobilize some of the swelling ranks have been underway for years, but are 
complicated by the sheer number of soldiers, a lack of incentives to disarm, and a range 
of factors that stem from the difficulty of reintegrating former combatants into the hollow 
Congolese economy.69 Additionally, rank and file FARDC personnel have demobilized, 
while troops from CNDP and other armed groups have been integrated into the state 
military in an appeasement process meant to centralize political control of legitimate 
armed groups in Kinshasa.70 This has caused tension between current and former military 
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personnel. On the whole, FARDC remains quite large and a major focus of international 
efforts to professionalize control of the military and curb executive abuses of power.  
2. Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)  
The leaders of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) were 
key agitators of the Rwandan genocide.71 Unwelcome in both the DRC and Rwanda, 
ranks of the militia consist largely of ethnic Hutus who have been fighting in the eastern 
Congo since 1994. Initial efforts to repatriate FDLR combatants to Rwanda in 2002 were 
complicated because the group purportedly posed a political threat to President Paul 
Kagame’s monopoly on power in neighboring Rwanda.72 The stalemate continues today 
as Kagame stands to gain little by repatriating FDLR militants and, unlike his 
counterparts in Kinshasa, he commands relatively tight control of border security into the 
country.73  
Some scholars disagree that FDLR forces consist principally of combatants 
implicated in the Rwandan genocide, opting instead for the countervailing argument that 
rank and file members of the FDLR were refugees along the Rwandan-Congo border, that 
they often relocated with extensive family networks, and utilized violence as a means of 
survival. “Most of the FDLR were people who had arrived in the Congo when they were 
young, had grown up there as refugees, and used violence because they had no other 
means of subsistence.”74 This argument does little to legitimize or delegitimize the FDLR 
militants, but reaffirms the salience of various groups in the Kivu region and the inherent 
friction that characterizes their competing networks. The truth probably stands 
somewhere between the two positions. New recruits who have joined in recent years 
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probably differ from elder FDLR combatants who carry the legacy of genocide and a 
decades-long attempt to subsist along the Congolese-Rwandan border as politico-military 
refugees.  
In early 2008, the FDLR numbered approximately 15,000, but dwindling 
recruitment and recent FARDC campaigns, coordinated with MONUC/MONUSCO, have 
reduced the ranks of combatants to around 8,000.75 The FDLR represents a particularly 
complicated militia group in the eastern DRC conflict. Active for years, they have 
perpetrated some of the worst violence against civilians and units often occupy an 
ambiguous relationship with FARDC. An incomplete list of crimes committed by FDLR 
units include rape, murder, resource exploitation, political corruption, land-grabbing, and 
a host of other illicit economic transactions.76 Yet, the militia is also intertwined with the 
state military. FARDC has integrated FDLR soldiers into its ranks through various DDR 
programs since 2002. However, multi-year efforts have failed to dismantle the militia and 
halt violence stemming from their activity in the Kivu regions.77 As a result of 
unorganized DDR initiatives, individual soldiers and units have been integrated into 
FARDC ranks, but often only in a titular capacity. Many still exhibit loyalty to former 
FDLR commanders, or do not recognize any chains of command.78 Both MONUSCO 
and the Kinshasa government currently distance themselves from FDLR and recent 
operations have specifically targeted the group.79  
3. National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) 
Until 2009, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) was a 
Tutsi-Congolese militia that operated, at least part-time, in Rwanda. For several years it 
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benefitted from the support of Rwandan President Paul Kagame.80 Following the 2006 
elections, the CNDP exerted greater control over North and South Kivu than any other 
group in the region, but since 2008 its grip on power has substantially diminished.81 The 
group was led by Laurent Nkunda who refused to join FARDC after the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2003, opting instead to capitalize on a then-loyal 
militia that posed a significant threat to President Kabila’s leadership. Rwandan support 
for the CNDP eroded security in the Kivu regions by propping up a quasi-political 
militant group that siphoned legitimacy and power from Kinshasa. The militia controlled 
a number of lucrative mines, providing financial resources that fueled war.82 For several 
years Nkunda waged a low-intensity conflict along the Rwandan-DRC border, defeating 
the Congolese military on at least two occasions before ceding significant portions of 
territory beginning in 2007.83  
A major problem in curtailing CNDP violence was the insecurity members of the 
group harbored about their participation in war crimes during the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide and the Kisangani war in 2002. Without promises of amnesty, it was unlikely 
CNDP leaders would give up their arms, even if economic incentives existed for doing 
so.84  In 2004, Nkunda attacked Bukavu, launching a full-scale rebellion, occasionally 
retreating into the hinterlands of North Kivu to reconnoiter with troops and manage 
assets. He introduced the CNDP government in 2006, a further attempt at legitimizing 
himself as a political stakeholder in the DRC and countering the new Kabila regime. 
After declaring his armed movement a government, Nkunda was finally apprehended in 
2008, at which point Bosco Ntaganda, the CNDP chief of staff, was elected leader of the 
para-military party.85  
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Ntaganda, wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, 
immediately agreed to partner with President Kabila and integrated his troops into the 
Congolese army in a questionable unification process known as “brassage.”86  Nkunda 
remains under house arrest in Rwanda.87 Ntaganda is a more complicated headache for 
MONUSCO and the international community because he is wanted for war crimes by the 
ICC, specifically for conscripting children and overseeing units that massacred civilians. 
Nevertheless, he currently holds the position of general in the FARDC army, 
commanding former CNDP units recently integrated into the state military.88 Opinions 
about the arrangement vary. Human rights groups are outraged by the blind eye that 
MONUSCO and other UN agencies turn to Ntaganda.89 Others are skeptical about the 
legitimacy of the FARDC troops under his command and the dubious claims that he no 
longer aspires to operate a para-military arm of the CNDP.90 Officially the militia might 
not exist, but the loyalty of former CNDP fighters undoubtedly belongs to Ntaganda, not 
FARDC authorities in Kinshasa.91 
4. Lord’s Resistance Army  
The LRA is one of the most notoriously brutal and remarkably unpredictable 
insurgencies in the world. The militia is mentioned in this thesis because it is responsible 
for recent civilian attacks in the DRC, and also because it casts light on the convoluted 
reality of violence in the eastern Congo. That is, it presents a visceral example of how 
warlords and other violent powerbrokers vie for control of state militaries, armed 
insurgencies, and militias in a landscape where social, political and economic motives are 
often impossible to decipher. Active since 1987, when Joseph Kony took up arms against 
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Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the history of the LRA is muddled by gruesome 
tactics and the bizarre, cultish ego of its leader.92  
For many years the group operated in Northern Uganda and remote regions of the 
Central African Republic, Sudan, and DRC. Known for its incredibly brutal treatment of 
civilians and unorthodox campaigns against various state militaries (including FARDC), 
the LRA political agenda, if one is at all decipherable, blends elements of Catholicism, 
Protestantism, and Acholi nationalism.93 Yet, after decades of terrorizing the jungles of 
East Africa, aside from the violent self-aggrandizement of Joseph Kony, the group’s 
long-term aspirations are difficult to outline. Moreover, in recent years its strength 
appeared to have diminished. “In mid-2007, the LRA high command acknowledged for 
the first time that there might be former LRA groups that no longer answer to it.”94 
However, 2010 and 2011 saw a resurgence in LRA violence as the group crossed from 
the Central African Republic into the DRC, attacking various locations in Orientale 
province.95 In the last two years, Kony’s men have brazenly attacked FARDC troops; in 
March 2011, as many as three battles took place between the FARDC and LRA.96 In a 
region characterized by unrest and unpredictability, the LRA remains the biggest 
wildcard and its relevance to POC is perhaps the most apparent. 
It is clear that any study of armed movements in the eastern DRC requires much 
greater attention to detail than the brief overview of the groups above. Indeed a dozen or 
more armed movements have been involved in the conflict over the last twenty years.97 
Richard Prunier, one of the most notable Congolese historians, describes the war as 
“continental” and asserts that state-sponsored military activity can be traced to at least ten 
countries on the continent; these range from Congolese neighbors Burundi, Rwanda and 
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Uganda, to more distant powers like Libya and South Africa.98 Additional sub-state 
insurgencies contribute to instability, and even local Mai Mai contingents, often formed 
for the ostensible reason of protecting small village clusters, engage in the wider culture 
of violence for economic, political, and/or social profit.99 
The preceding section introduced significant militant groups in the eastern DRC, 
including the official state military. The remaining sections in this chapter examine the 
three metrics used to consider whether MONUSCO effectively protects civilians or falls 
short of fulfilling its POC mandate. 
C.  METRIC 1: CIVILIAN MASSACRES 
Any methodology for monitoring civilian massacres is difficult. One challenge is 
the obvious fact that victims of group attacks are often killed and unable to report 
incidents. Additionally, individuals who witness mass killings and survive frequently 
suffer physical harm themselves, which can make attaining justice more difficult. Many 
are terrified to report the crimes for fear of reprisal attacks.100 Others are displaced, 
posing challenges for researchers trying to locate suitable assessment sites.101This study 
considers civilian massacres to be assaults against a sizable group of people, often 
village-wide, of whom the significant majority are not combatants.  
Despite the complications, several reliable resources are available to examine 
civilian massacres (i.e., group attacks) in the eastern Congo. Two scientific studies are 
considered in this section. The first is a population-based epidemiological study 
published by Kathryn Alberti and colleagues from MSF field offices throughout the 
DRC. The second study is a comprehensive research project overseen by Anneke Van 
Woudenberg and Ida Sawyer of Human Rights Watch. Their team interviewed 
approximately 1,000 households in the eastern DRC, examining the impact of violence 
on the economy, society and politics in the region. These data-dependent studies are 
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supplemented with articles from journalists and reports published by the UN Secretariat 
and the UN Group of Experts on the DR Congo, a nonpartisan, fact-finding committee of 
scholars and practitioners appointed by the Secretary-General. Each source records 
significant massacres of civilian populations; these range from direct attacks that produce 
fatalities numbering as few as ten to as many as several hundred. Presented in concert, 
they enumerate incidents where MONUSCO has failed to prevent village-wide civilian 
massacres since at least 2008, in some cases supporting FARDC troops immediately prior 
to Congolese military units carrying out attacks on civilians. 
In the widely respected Alberti Study, epidemiologists questioned approximately 
250 households about civilian casualties in three districts in the North Kivu province. The 
cross-sectional study represented a population of 200,000 and investigated the impact of 
violence between September 2008 and May 2009. Given this timeframe, the research 
evaluated violence in the region during the first year after MONUSCO’s POC mandate 
was approved by the Security Council. The findings are startling because they elaborate 
on the frequency and scope of village-level attacks in North Kivu. The study showed “the 
proportion of violent death” to be well above average. In two of the three districts where 
civilians were interviewed, at least one third of all deaths were the direct result of 
violence.102 In Masisi and Kitchanga, 30% of mortality rates for the population below 
age 5 were due to violence; but for the population over the age of 5, the percentage 
increased dramatically to 58% and 71% respectively.103  
The majority of the population also reported experiencing displacement. In the 
districts questioned, the reason for displacement was a “direct attack” on the village in 
61–85% of cases.104 This statistic is further examined in the subsequent section on 
internally displaced persons. Here, it underscores the nature of group violence on the 
affected population. In two of the three districts surveyed, the rate increases: over 80% of 
the population reported “direct attack” on a village or home as the reason for 
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displacement.105 That mortality rates caused by “direct attack” exceed 50% for a given 
population, overwhelmingly confirms the claim that civilian protection is largely non-
existent, regardless of the basis for evaluating POC standards. 
In the course of the study, researchers recorded those victims killed during 
militant assaults, but did not account for mortality rates affected by secondary conditions 
(such as displacement) that were not the immediate result of direct attacks.106  
Furthermore, the Alberti study probably under-reported the actual number of deaths 
caused by violence or displacement as several locations were abandoned by researchers 
due to the sudden outbreak of violent conflict. “These sites, and that from which the team 
was evacuated, were likely to have been more strongly affected by violence than those in 
which the survey could be conducted…These are populations that continue to be affected 
by conflict, are constantly moving, and likely have high levels of trauma and mortality, as 
yet unrecorded.”107 The conclusion of its own report suggests that while the percentage 
of civilian deaths stemming from violence and conflict affects the majority of the 
population surveyed in the Alberti study, it likely falls short of the real totals and 
misrepresents the accurate level of violence.  
A second study conducted by two Congolese experts interviewed over 1,000 
subjects and, like the Alberti publication, found that attacks on villages and citizen 
groups by soldiers were rampant in the eastern provinces during 2009.108 Researchers 
Sawyer and Van Woudenberg found that almost 1,900 civilians were specifically targeted 
and killed between January and September 2009 by members of the FDLR, FARDC or 
their allies.109 The report pinpoints nearly 1,500 civilian murders in less than a year, an 
average of over 150 per month in 2009. More importantly, the research demonstrates that 
killings were targeted—the civilian attacks were organized, and even included examples 
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of political assassinations.110 For example, village chiefs were specifically identified and 
killed. Other influential leaders were also slaughtered, usually either shot or butchered by 
machete or hoe.111 Sawyer and Van Woudenberg report that the tactic was effective at 
spreading insecurity throughout rural communities and escalating fears in the North and 
South Kivu provinces.112  
The inability of MONUSCO to disrupt these organized assaults and the fact that 
tactics such as political assassinations were used to further intimidate the population 
suggest troubling limitations to curbing systematic civilian casualties. As the authors 
explain, “[MONUSCO] officials did not set out clear conditions for their support, did not 
insist on the removal of known human rights abusers from the ranks of the Congolese 
army, and did not adequately prepare for the protection of the civilian population.”113 
These factors contributed to instability, further eroded the scant security in the region, 
and left the population vulnerable to violence in the future. 
Two other examples of MONUSCO’s inability to protect civilians can be 
observed in separate LRA campaigns, the Uele River massacre of 2010 and the so-called 
“Christmas Massacres” that took place in December-January 2008—2009. The LRA has 
remained a persistent and brutal rebel force in the region despite repeated efforts by 
MONUSCO to curb attacks by the group.114 In March 2010, BBC journalists reported 
previously undocumented village massacres in which 320 or more civilians were 
slaughtered.115 According to reporters, six or more villages were attacked over the course 
of five days in the region of the DRC that borders the Uele River west of Niangara, a 
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northeast town near the borders of Sudan and the Central African Republic.116 
Combatants abducted men, women and children and killed political leaders in many of 
the villages.117  
The tactics were sporadic and it is difficult to decipher their purpose or strategic 
goals. They undermined the dignity of community-members and seriously threatened the 
livelihoods of any survivors. As a Catholic priest in nearby Tapili explained, “We don’t 
understand what their strategy really is, but they clearly like killing, they like destroying 
things.”118 MONUSCO attempts to stymie the activity of Joseph Kony have been limited, 
and the LRA has proven its ability to continually wreak havoc on local communities. The 
Uele River attacks are important because they evince instances of militarized, yet 
inchoate violence. Although entire villages were destroyed, the LRA did not target 
political leaders. Furthermore, the appalling episodes that took place in December 2008, 
when the Christmas Massacres began, were repeated in a similar fashion over a year later 
in March 2010 when the Uele River campaign erupted. Over the course of a year, as 
intermittent violence continued, MONUSCO failed to extend POC to the Kivu provinces 
and deter the Uele River atrocities. 
In December 2008, as many as a dozen villages were attacked by members of the 
militia in what was dubbed the “Christmas Massacres.” Although numerous assaults took 
place between December 23 and January 13, the most violent incidents occurred 
December 24—28, 2008 when as many as 620 individuals were killed.119 The scenes 
from the series of attacks are particularly gruesome: children were abducted and women 
were raped; victims were ambushed with axes or club-like objects; most survivors were 
abducted and forced to carry looted goods for the combatants—their futures uncertain at 
best.120 After belligerents slaughtered residents in Batande, they then ate the feast 
villagers had prepared for Christmas before moving on to continue their killing spree. On 
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some nights rebels were able to burn as many as 900 houses; schools, churches and 
medical caches were also targeted, and their leaders numbered among the dead.121  
The importance of emphasizing these details is to demonstrate the village-wide 
destruction of both physical property and human life. Apart from mere wartime 
casualties, villages razed by LRA militants were completely destroyed. Agriculture and 
other natural resources were eviscerated. Essentially, the basic foundation for livelihoods 
was systematically stamped out during each raid. 
In addition to civilian deaths, the only constant in the attacks is that both 
MONUSCO peacekeepers and LRA combatants were in the region at the same time that 
both campaigns took place. As described earlier in this chapter, the LRA is one of the 
most unpredictable insurgencies in the world so it is not surprising that MONUSCO 
struggled to extend civilian protection and prevent LRA mortalities. However, the length 
of the campaign is troubling, as is the fact that MONUSCO also failed to prevent 
violence instigated by other combatant groups, even when peacekeepers knew such 
attacks were likely to occur.122 Indeed, the inability of MONUSCO to counter repeat and 
premeditated civilian massacres is one of the most discouraging aspects of the PKO’s 
ineffectiveness. 
An often-overlooked aspect of violence in the eastern Congo is the degree of 
planning and coordination by high-level military hierarchies. The FDLR is especially 
adept at such organized violence:  
The widespread and systematic nature of the attacks on civilians across 
North and South Kivu, in areas sometimes hundreds of kilometers apart, 
the similarity of the messages from the FDLR to local communities—
including in public meetings, warning letters and direct verbal threats—as 
well as the similarity of methods used during attacks, strongly indicate that 
the retaliatory attacks were ordered from the FDLR’s central command.123  
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First-hand accounts from perpetrators also detail how attacks were organized at a senior 
level by military commanders. “Dozens of former FDLR combatants interviewed by 
Human Rights Watch and others confirmed that no significant military operations could 
be conducted without clear orders from the military leadership.”124 Obviously, such 
planning implies gross human rights violations. It also raises disturbing questions about 
the political motives—rather than military commands—to which FDLR leadership might 
adhere. Finally, it suggests that MONUSCO was woefully unprepared to intercept or 
interrupt these military activities once they were initiated, a factor that certainly 
undermines the legitimacy and ability of the PKO to protect civilians. 
 In addition to rebel groups, the state military is also responsible for attacks on 
civilians and, by extension, so is MONUSCO. In his 2010 report on the DRC to the 
Security Council, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon provided extensive details about 
the shortcomings of the force to protect civilians in the village of Fizi from a FARDC 
attack: 
Armed groups continued to target civilians…In addition, human rights 
violations by elements of the national security forces continued to be 
reported in the context of ongoing military operations. Notably, on the 
night of 1–2 January, following a dispute between an element of FARDC 
and a civilian, FARDC elements carried out multiple exactions, including 
lootings, rape, torture, arrests and extortion, against the civilian population 
in Fizi town. MONUSCO immediately dispatched a patrol…A mobile 
operating base was established in Fizi on 7 January and a joint protection 
team mission was deployed on 8 January.125 
Close analysis of the report’s language reveals the disturbing nature of the attack: the 
“exactions” are reprisal killings against unarmed civilians who refused to “support” 
militarized groups.126  
According to the SG, they were carried out by FARDC troops who were assisted 
by UN peacekeepers days, if not hours, prior to the attacks. That is, the report by the 
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Secretary-General confirms that MONUSCO directly contributed resources—and in 
some cases participated in joint combat operations—with FARDC troops in the exact 
region on the exact dates that the civilian reprisal attacks took place.127 The attacks 
occurred during a series of kinetic activities implemented under Operation Hatua Yamana 
(“Formidable Reach”). Between December 29, 2010 and January 7, 2011 a FARDC unit 
in Fizi raped and tortured civilians before razing the town.128 The commission of these 
crimes occurred at the hands of FARDC soldiers while MONUSCO troops were 
deployed in the region, supporting the FARDC contingent.129 Despite operating in the 
area, peacekeepers did not respond to Fizi until seven days after violence broke out.130 
Fizi, Masisi, Kitchanga, and Batanda each present evidence of a major gap in 
MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians. Each displays the horrors of rebel and state 
military attacks against civilians—and the inability of the contingent to prevent village-
wide assaults. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of civilian massacres in the 
eastern DRC. First, the two population studies established that direct village attacks 
resulted in thousands of civilian casualties since the MONUSCO mandate was 
implemented. In several areas, the majority of civilian mortalities for an extended period 
of time, usually ranging from six months to one year, were the result of militia-related 
violence, despite the deployment of peacekeepers. Second, internal UN reports show that 
Congolese troops who raped, maimed and killed civilians received direct support from 
MONUSCO in the days leading up to civilian attacks. From this, one can conclude that 
the presence of peacekeepers directly facilitated attacks against civilians, rather than 
protecting them from such abuses—the exact opposite of their mandate. Furthermore, 
protection teams deployed by MONUSCO failed to reach civilians in time to prevent 
assaults and their proximity to a population guaranteed neither protection, nor a timely 
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response to ongoing violence once it broke out. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude 
that MONUSCO failed to prevent civilian massacres and direct military assaults on 
village populations in the months and years after the mandate was approved by the 
Security Council.  
D. METRIC 2: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS  
Several reasons exist for selecting internal displacement as an indicator for 
measuring the success of MONUSCO to extend POC to the local population. First, noting 
the historic roots of displacement in the Congolese conflict, the Security Council cited it 
as a factor that directly undermines POC.131 Displacement was also recognized by 
Kinshasa as a POC priority and an impediment to peace in the eastern provinces.132 
Secondly, the problem of refugees affects regional security, another impetus for members 
of the SC to invest resources in the PKO.133 Third, the other two metrics considered in 
this thesis examine specific instances of violence that physically target civilians. 
Displacement is caused by primary factors stemming from conflict, but also from 
secondary and tertiary conflict factors (e.g., economic incentives, social stability, 
opportunities for education, access to land rights, etc.).134 Displacement erodes human 
security over the long-term and leaves migrant populations open to a plethora of risks but 
is not always recorded as a direct threat to physical safety. The study is more thorough 
for including a metric that accounts for these secondary and tertiary causes. Finally, the 
protection of IDP groups is one of the specific factors identified by SC Resolution 1856 
(2008) that provided MONUSCO its mandate to extend protection to civilians.135 In this 
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regard, it is one of the only demonstrable and measurable indicators provided by the 
Security Council resolution that established MONUSCO’s POC policy.  
The trend in IDP statistics for the eastern Congolese provinces is best 
characterized by steady growth since the MONUC/MONUSCO transition. The Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), a branch of the Norwegian Refugee Council, 
listed the 2008–2009 displaced population at 2.1 million individuals.136 The UNHCR 
isolates the total “population of concern” within countries into several categories 
(including refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs and returnees). It assessed that the population 
of concern grew slightly from 2.24 million in 2010 to over 2.3 million in 2011.137 
Therefore, both the UN and external monitors verify that the population of IDPs in the 
country has grown since the approval of SC Resolution 1856 (2008), which explicitly 
called for the PKO to deliver assistance to the this group.  
While the burden to alleviate the expanding displaced population does not fall 
squarely on MONUSCO, most agencies usually reference the PKO as a critical 
interagency partner. The question that remains unanswered is whether MONUSCO 
contributed to the growth in the IDP population or whether the number grew regardless of 
MONUSCO activity. This section will examine several instances where MONUSCO 
activity contributed to an increase in the size of displaced populations. These activities 
involve direct support for the Congolese state military, including operations where 
FARDC units assisted by MONUSCO peacekeepers instigated violence and created 
circumstances that caused non-combatants to flee their homes. The conclusion is that 
MONUSCO clearly initiated activities that led to specific incidents of displacement. It is 
unlikely the overall spike in IDP numbers is the sole result of MONUSCO action (or 
inaction), but the peacekeeping operation certainly functioned as a catalyst for 
displacement in observable, if isolated, episodes. 
The most contentious examples of MONUSCO activity that directly contributed 
to internal displacement include a series of three operations that were jointly undertaken 
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with FARDC troops. These include Operation Umoja Wetu (January 2009—February 
2009), Operation Kimia II (February/March 2009—December 2009), and Operation 
Amani Leo (January 2010—present).138 The size and scope of these operations changed 
over time, but each was implemented with MONUSCO as a partner.  
The UN secretariat asserts that most assistance came in the form of logistics 
support, transportation, and supplies; however, each included multiple firefights and 
planned military assaults.139 These campaigns are noticeable for their proactive 
involvement of peacekeepers in waging kinetic activity against armed groups (both 
Congolese and Rwandan).140 Since the inception of the operations, numerous human 
rights groups, and even the UN itself, have criticized their effects on displaced 
populations.  
In response to criticism, MONUSCO has emphasized its role in providing 
logistical support to FARDC, pointing out the responsibility of the Congolese state to 
investigate accusations about violations of the military code of conduct.141 Unfortunately, 
the decision by MONUSCO to defer to Congolese state authorities does nothing to hold 
officials accused of war crimes accountable for their actions. Rather, it abdicates 
responsibility for critical breaches of justice to state legal institutions that are marred by 
shortcomings with regards to the rule of law. Additionally, despite the tremendous 
tactical support, many organizations maintain that MONUSCO directly supported 
FARDC troops that committed human rights violations and war crimes, involving 
village-wide assaults and the subsequent displacement of civilians. This claim was briefly 
considered in the context of Fizi in the previous section, but it should be explored in more 
detail when examining the IDP crisis as substantial evidence suggests a causal 
relationship between displacement and MONUSCO assistance.  
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The IDMC of the Norwegian Refugee Council, for instance, found that a 
substantial civilian population in the eastern Kivus was displaced as an unexpected 
consequence of the MONUC-supported military operations that began in 2009.142 In 
these operations, MONUC/MONUSCO troops assisted the Congolese army with 
provisions, munitions, and transportation logistics.143 FARDC carried out strikes against 
FDLR and Mai Mai militia, whereby the peacekeeping contingent directly contributed to 
the exponential growth in the number of civilian IDPs as residents fled their homes in 
fear of the converging militias and armed forces.144 “By the end of the year, an estimated 
990,000 people were displaced in North Kivu, and 690,000 in South Kivu.”145 In 2011, 
the rate of returnees grew to 600,000, perhaps an indication that the operations might 
have been successful and that civilians could safely return, except that just as many 
civilians fled during the same period of time that the repatriating population grew.146  
Clearly, the hemorrhaging IDP crisis in the Congo was not resolved by MONUSCO-
supported kinetic activity. Indeed, there is convincing evidence that it probably 
contributed to the problem. 
The Humanitarian Working Group, another organization working in the region, 
found the Kimia II and Amani Leo operations had an especially pointed role in 
undermining POC by displacing civilians. A 2011 report concluded, “Both offensives 
have had very grave consequences for civilians…and overall did not meet their 
obligations under international humanitarian law to minimize harm to civilians.”147 As 
Human Rights Watch showed, the most devastating illustration of MONUSCO-supported 
operational casualties is that for every FDLR combatant who was killed or repatriated in 
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2009, almost 900 civilians were displaced.148 Another report found that in the Kivu 
provinces at least 1.2 million individuals were displaced due to Umoja Wetu, Kimia II, 
and Amani Leo.149 Perhaps the MONUC/MONUSCO assistance in these three 
operations led to an overall increase in civilian protection, but this seems unlikely as both 
internal UN reports and external studies documented their chronic negative impacts on 
civilian populations.  
In his 2011 reports for the Security Council, the Secretary-General provided fewer 
details about the ongoing operations than he had in previous years, perhaps because of 
the growing disfavor of these joint combat operations among many in the international 
community. However, earlier reports point out many examples of the blowback that 
resulted from the MONUSCO-FARDC military partnership. For instance, in a 2009 
report that highlighted the Kimia II operation, he stated, “The humanitarian situation 
deteriorated during the reporting period as a result of human rights violations committed 
by FDLR and FARDC elements.”150 This insight is an important piece of institutional 
self-reflection that shows both rebel and state militants were responsible for displacement 
and human rights violations, specifically a state military that was kinetically supported by 
MONUSCO. He also lamented, “In response to the Kimia II operations, FDLR conducted 
a series of reprisal attacks against the population.”151 As mentioned previously, in 
addition to civilian casualties, a consequence of reprisal killings is increased 
displacement.152 Essentially, the SG report links kinetic involvement of MONUSCO 
directly to the IDP population in the DRC. 
Given that reprisal killings clearly exacerbate refugee rates, and that MONUSCO 
reinforced kinetic activity that caused revenge attacks in 2009 and 2010, the MONUSCO 
strategy that supports the FARDC seems to compete with, if not outright undermine, any 
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humanitarian assistance strategy that aims to reduce IDPs. As one researcher pointed out, 
“Counter-insurgency operations implemented by the DRC government and occasionally 
supported by MONUSCO have resulted in severe human rights abuses. State-building 
can conflict with humanitarian objectives when what is being strengthened is a predatory 
state.”153 In February 2010, the Norwegian Refugee Council claimed that MONUSCO 
support of FARDC troops contributed directly to the displacement of over one million 
people. “Fighting between militia groups and Congolese armed forces supported by the 
UN, as well as attacks and violence against civilians, caused the displacement of around a 
million people in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2009.”154  
This cacophony of accusations shows an explicit connection between MONUSCO 
strategy to support a state military and the ramifications on populations that are displaced 
by the realities of such kinetic activity. The conclusion that can be drawn from the 
literature is that rather than contributing to civilian protection, the peacekeeping strategy 
creates more insecurity for the population by both directly and indirectly engaging in 
combat operations that are causally linked to large-scale displacement in the eastern 
Congo. 
Having made the claim that MONUSCO directly contributed to the IDP crisis in 
the Congo and then presented evidence to support this claim, it is important to consider 
whether the PKO addresses the problem of IDPs as a policy issue, and, if so, what is done 
to stymie flight and offset the population’s vulnerabilities. Indeed, such a policy review 
shows that the peacekeeping operation has struggled with a humanitarian response to 
displacement for several years.  
Since at least 2009, internal UN audits and international agencies have criticized 
MONUSCO for the MONUC/MONUSCO-assisted missions that further spurred IDP 
rates.155 In response to such scrutiny, MONUSCO adopted a policy of conditionality in 
January 2010.156 Under this arrangement, MONUSCO screens the specific commanders 
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that peacekeepers will support before deployment. If a FARDC commander does not 
meet certain standards, MONUSCO will not extend support to the contingent.157 
However, a recent study produced by a UN think tank found the conditionality policy 
actually decreased UN monitoring and accountability.158   
This was partly as a result of a cumbersome screening process for 
battalion commanders, less than 10 percent of whom passed. This was also 
due to the limited scope of the vetting process as the conditionality policy 
was not intended to address the issue of impunity within the FARDC, 
which was first and foremost the responsibility of the Congolese 
authorities.159 
As the paper indicates, a lack of central authority in Kinshasa renders the policy entirely 
ineffective. More to the point is the example of Bosco Ntaganda, the FARDC commander 
wanted for war crimes since an ICC arrest warrant was issued in 2008.160 To date, the 
DRC government either is unwilling or unable to comply with the warrant.161  The 
unwillingness of Kinshasa to adhere to ICC demands for the eastern Congo’s most 
notorious general raises serious questions about whether they will enforce the 
conditionality policy on FARDC officers of a lower rank. 
In response to POC criticism, MONUSCO implemented a system of Joint 
Protection Teams (JPTs) in late 2008/early 2009.  Responsible for a range of POC tasks, 
these mobile teams are both predictive (of threats to civilians) and suggestive (of 
solutions to threats).162 Divisions from civilian affairs, human rights, political affairs and 
child protection agencies within the greater UN umbrella contribute to JPTs, and 62 of 
the teams were deployed on five-day missions to various eastern DRC field bases.163 The 
teams have been praised for their mobility and flexible nature in the field. Additionally, 
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assessments undertaken by teams are considered valuable to various UN agencies. 
However, despite these modest successes, JPTS are impeded by a lack of qualified 
specialists, and the short-term nature of their deployments, which are limited to five days 
in the field.164  These factors hinder the impact of JPTs and drastically decrease their 
capacity to establish protection mechanisms. 
E. METRIC 3: RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE  
The frequency of rape and sexual violence in the Kivu and Ituri provinces is 
perhaps the most commonly reported aspect of the Congolese conflict. Headlines 
summarize the brutal details with sweeping, if not hyperbolic, rhetoric: “Rape Epidemic 
Raises Trauma of Congo War” (The New York Times, October 2007), “Hillary Clinton 
demands arrests over Congo sexual violence” (The Guardian, August 2009), “Congo’s 
Sexual Violence Goes Far Beyond Rape” (The Washington Post, July 2007), “Haunted 
by Congo rape dilemma” (BBC News, May 2010). 
 As the media accounts suggest, much has been written about sexual abuse in the 
eastern DR Congo, and it is important to decipher sexual violence associated with the 
protracted conflict from the more widespread problem of sexual abuse writ large, which 
includes forms of domestic abuse and rape common to areas that are not plagued by 
ongoing violence. This is not always simple because rape is an under-reported crime, 
even during times of peace.165  
Nevertheless, statistics of documented sexual violence in the eastern DRC suggest 
that if unacknowledged cases of abuse are ignored, the rates of sexual and gender-based 
violence (SGBV) in the region far exceed the number of similar atrocities that occur in 
other conflict and post-conflict settings.166 That is, enough clinical evidence has been 
gathered from the thousands of victims who sought justice after rape or sexual assault to 
demonstrate a gross gouge in the number of cases in the eastern DRC when compared to 
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statistics that are indicative of more “expected” levels of SGBV.167 This section first 
outlines what is meant by “sexual violence.” It then details the high levels of SGBV in 
the DRC and considers what impact MONUSCO has had on such violence. 
To a less-informed audience, sexual violence, brutal though it may be, is often the 
simplest and most straightforward method for interpreting the conflict. It offers a one-
dimensional and appropriately abhorrent narrative. However, such a basic understanding 
of the rape-as-war dynamic fails to outline the true nature of sexual violence in the 
eastern DRC—one that is as layered and complicated as it is intolerable. For example, 
both women and men are victims of rape in the eastern Congo, as well as both boys and 
girls.168 Therefore, the commonly used “sexual and gender-based violence” (SBGV) 
acronym is useful, but not comprehensive. Like women, men are also targeted as sexual 
victims for purposes of inflating social antagonisms, waging war and ensuring ethnic 
marginalization.169 
Additionally, rape is not reserved for the innocent. Like much of the Congolese 
conflict, the distinction between combatant and non-combatant is often dubious, with 
many individuals claiming to be an armed combatant and a victim of sexual violence (this 
victim-perpetrator duality is also true of forced displacement, physical assault, ethnic 
cleansing, and other crimes of war).170 Therefore, when one speaks of a victim of rape, 
one might reference a frail grandmother in her late eighties, or an arms-bearing young 
male whose experiences include both the victimized stigma of sexual assault and the 
criminalized stigma of rebel soldier. Furthermore, sexual abuse can come in many forms. 
 The devastating crimes of gang rapes and systematic ‘sexual warfare’ grab 
headlines, but do not summarize the totality of sexual violence during conflict. The 
trafficking of women and children, various forms of sexual slavery, the use of children in 
pornography, the purchase of female ‘housemates,’ and the practice of fathering children 
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in local communities are all crimes of sexual abuse.171 During conflict these are all 
considered crimes of war, and they all contribute to the multidimensional conflict in the 
eastern Congo and its shattering effects on the civilian population. Although cursory, this 
analysis provides a brief overview of sexual violence in the eastern DRC, and, having 
introduced the current dilemma, this section proceeds to examine the difficulties 
MONUSCO has faced in its attempt to curtail the widespread sexual violence. 
Between 2005–2007, a reported 20,517 women were raped in South Kivu.172 
More recently, the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) published a 
study of the conflict that extrapolated findings from a sample population to account for 
5.2 million of the most at-risk members of the population in North Kivu, South Kivu and 
Ituri in 2010. In the three provinces, nearly 40% of women respondents identified as 
being a victim of sexual abuse, and almost 24% of men reported similar crimes.173 Of 
these, the vast majority reported the sexual assault to be conflict-related. 51% of those 
who experienced sexual abuse claim to have been raped.174 
Other instances of sexual assault included molestation, being forced to perform 
sex acts with other civilians, abduction, sexual slavery and forced marriage.175 The paper 
summarized the elaborate and complicated role of violence in the region and the 
exceedingly high rate of sexual abuse as a tool used by combatants in the conflict: 
The findings of this study indicate widespread sexual violence and human 
rights abuses in North and South Kivu and Ituri since the start of the 
conflict. The prevalence of sexual violence is significantly higher than 
previously reported in other conflict and postconflict settings…Previous 
studies have been hampered methodologically but do indicate that limited 
numbers of women and men report sexual violence cases through the 
avenues provided by medical and judicial organizations/systems.176  
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The JAMA study is a crucial piece of SGBV literature on violence in the eastern DRC, 
important for its scientific basis and the Association’s apolitical stance on the conflict. It 
is also one of several publications that records figures sexual violence that are much 
higher than records provided by MONUSCO.  
In 2009 MONUSCO reported 2,000 incidents of sexual violence. In the same 
year, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) accounted for over 17,000 cases.177  
The NGO Refugees International documented over 17,500 cases of sexual violence in 
2009.178 These discrepancies pose problems for research, but more importantly they 
point to the unsettling fact that MONUSCO probably accounted for far fewer instances of 
sexual violence than those that were actually perpetrated. The drastic discrepancy 
between the MONUSCO number and the scientifically verified rates published by 
JAMA—approximately 15,000—are troubling for two major reasons. First, the 
discrepancy shows that MONUSCO is unable to prevent thousands of cases of SGBV per 
year in the Kivu provinces; this appears true regardless of whether the source is 
MONUSCO, JAMA, or Refugees International. Second, given the scrupulous monitoring 
of data used by the JAMA study, and the similar findings by Refugees International, it 
appears likely that MONUSCO records of sexual violence are woefully inadequate and 
under-record actual cases. Therefore, not only have peacekeepers struggled to prevent 
incidents of SGBV since their mandate was approved, it also seems unlikely that 
MONUSCO is equipped with research and data analysis tools to ensure prevention in the 
future.  
One area of consensus centers on militias and institutions that are responsible for 
sexual violence. Although agreement is not universal, it provides a good starting point for 
considering the responsibility of perpetrators and the role of MONUSCO. Most 
prominently, groups that perpetrated SGBV between 2008–2011 include the LRA, 
CNDP, FDLR, and FARDC.179 Clearly, sexual violence occurs to a startling degree; but 
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how can raw data about SGBV shed light on whether or not the MONUSCO 
peacekeeping operation fails to provide POC?  
Wills points out that a culture of expectation is frequently used to justify rape 
during peacekeeping operations. As he explains, this stems from “pervasive beliefs both 
amongst local militias and war lords, and on the part of peacekeeping forces, that abuse 
of women is inevitable and to be expected in war; and therefore to be viewed as collateral 
damage rather than as a factor contributing to the social and economic instability that 
fuels and perpetuates conflict.”180 Research has also shown that some combatants believe 
specific types of rape (forcible penetration, molestation of children under ten) constitute 
criminal acts whereas milder forms of rape (abduction) do not.181 This factor of 
“justifiability” might suggest specific types of sexual violence that peacekeepers are most 
likely to encounter, but it still does not evaluate their effectiveness. 
Three questions can elucidate the problem: Does sexual violence occur regardless 
of MONUSCO?  Does sexual violence occur because of MONUSCO? Does sexual 
violence decline because of MONUSCO? The last question obviously presents a scenario 
whereby MONUSCO oversees a decline of sexual assault as a result of peacekeepers 
deployed to the region. The second question presents a worst-case scenario whereby 
incidents of sexual violence spike with the presence of MONUSCO troops, and the first 
question presents a scenario whereby MONUSCO is more or less effete in delivering the 
civilian population from perpetrators of sexual crimes. 
  The unfortunate conclusion that can be drawn from research conducted since the 
launch of the MONUSCO operation is that sexual violence certainly takes place 
regardless of MONUSCO presence, and in some cases, sexual violence coincides with 
MONUSCO activities. A recent investigation by the UN Joint Human Rights Office 
(UNJHRO) found that 47 women reported being raped over a two-day period between 
December 31, 2010 and January 1, 2011. The rapes, which had been previously reported 
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by news outlets, were confirmed by the UNJHRO and tied directly to FARDC troops 
who had been assisted by MONUSCO during Operation Hatua Yamana near Fizi.182  
 Furthermore, the report cited limited influence MONUSCO had on training 
FARDC troops to prevent future attacks. “The capacity of MONUSCO to supervise the 
behaviour of the FARDC soldiers supported during joint operations remains limited due 
in particular to security and logistical constraints.”183 The report detail the systematic 
nature of the crime and the role of the Congolese military, which was supported at the 
time by a joint MONUSCO operation in Fizi:  
The victims were threatened with machetes and truncheons and were then 
undressed and searched before being raped in turn by the assailants in 
groups of two or four, sometimes in the presence of their children. Some 
women were reportedly raped by a man identified as a FARDC officer 
called ‘Capitaine,’ who led the attack on Bushani, and by his two 
bodyguards. 184 
In this example, the FARDC troops cooperated with MONUSCO and simultaneously 
committed egregious war crimes.185 The result shows that MONUSCO failed to curb 
civilian violence—in this instance, violence stemmed directly from the state military and 
included the public rape of two or more women by a senior officer, the “Capitaine.” In 
response to the questions posed previously, sexual violence did not decline because of 
MONUSCO presence. It either occurred regardless of the peacekeepers deployed in the 
region; or, if MONUSCO provided impunity for FARDC troops, it is possible rapes took 
place because of their deployment.  
Similar to the civilian massacres at the hands of FDLR soldiers, instances of rape 
in the eastern DR Congo suggest high levels of organization and political assembling, 
particularly by FDLR leadership. Seniors in the rebel movement deny that orders were 
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ever given to rape, kill or maim civilians, but the ICC issued arrest warrants for three top 
commanders in 2009, accusing them of these crimes. The men arrested were Ignace 
Murwanashyaka, Straton Musoni, and Callixte Mbarushimana.186 All three currently 
stand trial in Stuttgart, Germany.187  
According to the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, the men had regular contact 
with FDLR military commanders who operated in the field while they planned political 
and public relations strategies for the organization in Europe.188 Ignace Murwanashyaka, 
who likens himself to President Barack Obama, operated the FDLR out of Mannheim, 
Germany for over twenty years.189  He was arrested in November 2009 and charged with 
29 counts of crimes against humanity and 39 war crimes. Although he vehemently denied 
the charges at the start of his trial in May 2011, prosecutors accuse him and a syndicate of 
other high-ranking commanders of masterminding attacks against civilians (including the 
rapes described above) from Paris and Mannheim.190  
Christian Ritscher, the senior public prosecutor for the case, outlined the 
systematic manner in which Murwanashyaka and at least two other FDLR political 
leaders orchestrated brutal violence against an impoverished and unprotected civilian 
population on a distant continent:  
We have a long list of attacks on the civilian population, killings, people 
shot because they were not co-operating with the FDLR, women gang 
raped, rape as a means of armed fight, as means of civil war. There were 
also pillages at the centre, where complete villages were burned down. 
Our understanding is that the two defendants had knowledge of 
everything, at least most of it.191 
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If convictions are indeed delivered, they further demonstrate how successful FDLR 
commanders were at the implementation of sexual violence as a tool for waging war.  
The trial does not directly show how MONUSCO failed to provide civilian 
protection in an operational capacity. However, it suggests that at a strategic level the 
MONUSCO mission was not able to curb systematic violence plotted against unarmed 
civilians. The DPKO and the greater UN apparatus are also at fault for strategic 
shortcomings. After all, Murwanashyaka and his ministers operated from Europe, and 
while the MONUSCO mandate is broad, it does not call for the dismantling of an 
international politico-military cell. However, both Security Council resolutions and 
reports published by the Group of Experts call for, and describe, the collaborative 
relationship between the DPKO and MONUSCO.192  
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. The first and most obvious 
is that MONUSCO has not adequately extended protection to civilians in the eastern 
DRC from extraordinary rates of sexual violence. That is, rape and SGBV recurs 
regardless of MONUSCO’s field presence. Second, and perhaps more nuanced, is that 
MONUSCO failed to prevent repeated—and systemic—incidents of sexual assault, 
especially those perpetrated by the FDLR. However, the MONUSCO mandate called for 
the prevention of sexual violence; it did not necessitate the disruption of international 
FDLR political cells. Nevertheless, the difficulty peacekeepers had implementing tactical 
prevention of civilian violence returns to a larger theme in the MONUSCO literature, the 
possibility that such an unwieldy mandate is too broad and, in its breadth, provides 
limited options for successful implementation.  
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis tests the hypothesis that MONUSCO failed to establish adequate POC 
standards in the eastern Congo. The claim is based on three metrics: rates of civilian 
massacres, rates of internally displaced persons and the prevalence of sexual violence. 
Findings show that since the first SC resolution mandated civilian protection, 
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MONUSCO peacekeepers have not directly prevented village-wide massacres, 
minimized the likelihood of displacement or reduced and eliminated SGBV.  
In instances such as Operation Hatua Yamana and Operation Kimia II, the PKO 
actually supported perpetrators responsible for civilian casualties. Specifically, village-
wide assaults in which dozens of civilians were slaughtered by FARDC soldiers received 
logistical support by MONUSCO in 2010 and 2011. Because of their failure to extend 
POC to the population, human rights groups accused peacekeepers of supporting 
Congolese military units that committed war crimes and human rights abuses. Despite 
providing helicopter lift, medical evacuations, and rations to government troops that 
participated in assaults on civilians in North and South Kivu, the UN and MONUSCO 
adamantly deny these charges. The refusal to recognize these claims draws into question 
the legitimacy of the PKO and its ability to extend protection in the future. 
In addition to civilian assaults, the number of IDPs in the region has not decreased 
significantly. Moreover, inadequate POC has contributed to displacement so that as 
vulnerable groups are resettled, different segments of the population are subsequently 
uprooted. Mechanisms put in place by peacekeepers, such as Joint Protection Teams, 
have failed to shrink the growing IDP population, as has the policy of conditionality. The 
policy, intended to prevent FARDC commanders accused of human rights abuses from 
controlling units supported by MONUSCO, has meant that many Congolese units operate 
unilaterally without guidance, oversight, or accountability from peacekeepers. 
Additionally, FARDC units supported by MONUSCO peacekeepers share direct causal 
ties with displacement of the local population in operations such as Umoja Wetu, Kimia 
II, and Amani Leo. Effectively, both the efforts to sanction criminal units of the state 
military and to reward the professional arm of FARDC have met in failure. 
Finally, despite years of negative media and  scrupulous attention from the upper 
echelons of the UN hierarchy, little evidence suggests MONUSCO has curbed sexual 
violence in the DRC. Rates of SGBV in the eastern Congo are disproportionate on a 
global scale, even for conflict zones. Similar to lapses in IDP policy, MONUSCO troops 
have directly trained or delivered physical support to FARDC and other troops 
responsible for committing sexual violence. After considering the two hypotheses 
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initially put forward, the conclusion this thesis draws is that MONUSCO does not prevent 
any of the three metrics necessary to establish POC norms. Furthermore, some of the 
policies, tactics and operations implemented by the PKO actually contribute to violence 





This thesis examines civilian protection in the Eastern DRC, specifically in the 
context of the MONUSCO peacekeeping operation. Since September 2008, the PKO has 
been charged to protect civilians as a component of its mandate. Clarity about the 
meaning of civilian protection is obscured by the lack of a codified definition, the 
obviously broad scope of civilian protection tasks, and the inherent divisions between 
military and humanitarian communities. Often operating in shared “theater” or “space,” 
each community engages conflict with the same end goal of achieving stability and 
peace, but with vastly different languages, tools, resources, and methodologies. Military 
approaches to POC often involve kinetic activity and the introduction of troops, 
machinery and personnel to impose security and establish a peaceful theater. The 
humanitarian community understands POC to be a robust set of goals that incorporate 
positive elements of peace alongside basic human security. This thesis proposes a 
working definition for POC in the DRC that shares important factors to both military and 
humanitarian institutions. In doing so it seeks to bridge the gap between language, 
culture, and implementation that often arises when these two communities converge on 
the same conflict zone. It then tests the definition against the MONUSCO case study to 
determine whether the PKO in the DRC has successfully implemented civilian protection 
since it was first mandated in Resolution 1856 (2008). The thesis shows that MONUSCO 
struggled to achieve each of the metrics, suggesting that civilians have not been fully 
protected under the auspices of the UN operation. 
B. METRIC 1 
The first metric tested was whether MONUSCO peacekeepers prevented civilian 
massacres from taking place in the eastern DRC. Civilian massacres are understood to be 
attacks against sizable populations of non-combatants that range from several citizens to 
entire villages. This thesis shows that MONUSCO failed to prevent civilian massacres 
committed by nearly every major rebel group in the eastern DRC.  
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Evidence collected since 2009 reveals that all major armed groups in the eastern 
Congo have committed sweeping attacks against non-combatants and unarmed civilians. 
Perpetrators include the LRA, FDLR, CNDP, and even rogue or undisciplined FARDC 
units. The most straightforward and brazen of the attacks were committed by LRA, 
during which entire villages were massacred over a series of weeks. MONUSCO 
peacekeepers were unable to respond to the war parties undertaken by LRA militants and 
interrupt a series of their vicious, unpredictable assaults against unarmed civilians. 
Additionally, CNDP, FDLR, and less organized Mai Mai militias also struck entire 
populations, killing scores of civilians with impunity. 
In addition to militias and various armed groups, between 2009 and 2012, 
MONUSCO did not prevent massacres of civilians by organized, and in some cases state-
sponsored, military units. Peacekeepers failed to intercept targeted civilian attacks by 
members of FARDC, FDLR, and their allies. In some cases these took on the form of 
political assassinations. In others, rape and torture were an element of more widespread 
killings. Human Rights Watch recorded several thousand deaths since 2009, all instigated 
by militant units that answer to a chain of command and demonstrate an organized 
hierarchy. In the case of the FDLR, officers acted on behalf of the political machinations 
of fugitive leaders in Europe. In the case of FARDC, units demonstrated a significant 
degree of autonomy that implies an inability of political leaders, including President 
Joseph Kabila, to exert centralized power over the country’s armed forces from Kinshasa. 
Even more startling is the fact that MONUSCO peacekeepers trained and supported 
FARDC units that later contributed to, or allowed, civilian massacres. 
C. METRIC 2 
The second metric tested in this hypothesis was the contribution of MONUSCO 
peacekeepers to the internally displaced population. The thesis found that MONUSCO 
contributed to specific incidents of displacement. Most noticeably this occurred under the 
auspices of Operations Umoja Wetu, Kimia II, and Amani Leo, a series of joint military 
activities MONUSCO undertook beginning in January 2009 that were implemented 
alongside FARDC.  Reports published by Human Rights Watch showed individual 
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incidents of displacement resulting from the military operations number in the hundreds 
and thousands while studies conducted on the larger IDP population across the Kivu 
regions show that as many as 1.2 million persons were removed from their homes since 
2009 as a result of the MONUSCO-FARDC joint operations.  
In addition to isolated incidents of displacement, MONUSCO struggled to 
implement strategic changes that addressed the IDP crisis. When such adjustments to 
strategy were introduced, such as the policy of conditionality or the establishment of Joint 
Protection Teams, the planning and framework for these developments overlooked 
operational factors that hampered the PKO’s efficacy.  For instance, the impunity 
afforded to high-ranking FARDC officers was not fully realized before the conditionality 
policy went into effect. Nor were the difficulties of vetting and screening commanders 
that MONUSCO peacekeepers later supported in combat operations. Both factors 
undermined the potential success of the conditionality policy as peacekeepers were then 
either forced to continue working with corrupt officers, or ignore them altogether. 
MONUSCO peacekeepers, in trying to address corruption within the Congolese military 
structure as a method for curbing IDP violence, took on a problem that might have been 
too large and systemic for the PKO. The limited success suggests that MONUSCO is 
under-resourced; or, perhaps more realistically, the POC mandate is too ambitious.   
Similar to the conditionality policy, Joint Protection Teams were meant to curb 
violence and displacement in extremely volatile areas. In theory, they would quickly 
respond to threats and protect civilians from outbursts of violence. In practice, the teams 
were not as agile and fast-moving as intended. This was partially due to the lack of 
available resources and experts, and partially due to the severity of the dense jungle and 
sporadic, but lethal, combat in the DRC’s most violent regions. The struggles faced by 
JPTs posit further evidence that the scope of the mandate overlooked the harshness of the 
environment and operational limitations of MONUSCO in the eastern Congo. The 
mission did not curb the number of IDPs, and, in some cases, it contributed directly to its 
increase. 
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D. METRIC 3 
The third metric tested in the thesis was whether MONUSCO prevented instances 
of sexual violence. This thesis does not submit new data to the existing body of literature 
about sexual violence in the DRC as so much as been written about the subject; however, 
it does articulate the elements of SGBV in the eastern Congo that contradict acceptable 
standards of civilian protection, an area of study that is less established. First, the 
preceding chapter presented evidence that demonstrates levels of sexual violence 
disproportionate to sex crimes perpetrated in other conflict zones.193 This fact alone 
would be enough to demonstrate an egregious shortcoming in efforts to install civilian 
protection.  
However, the problem of rape and sexual assault was outlined as one of the most 
acute POC challenges in the Congo. In 2010, the Security Council prioritized a list of 
items that MONUSCO should undertake to ensure civilian protection. Listed in order of 
importance, the third priority explicitly states that peacekeepers should “ensure the 
protection of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including all forms 
of sexual and gender-based violence protecting civilians.”194 The same clause goes on to 
affirm the rule of law and assert that security forces must be brought to justice if they are 
found in violation of the DRC’s zero-tolerance policy for SGBV. Given the attention paid 
to the matter by both the Security Council and the central government in Kinshasa, there 
can be little doubt that MONUSCO has not fulfilled its mandate in regard to protecting 
civilians from sexual violence. 
The discrepancy between the incidents of sexual violence reported by 
MONUSCO and the number of cases recorded by other organizations, including the UN 
Population Fund, is significant and suggests the PKO is not equipped to manage the 
current crisis or prevent future assaults. In 2009, when the UNFPA concluded that 17,000 
rapes took place in the eastern DRC under the surveillance of peacekeepers, MONUSCO 
reported only 2,000 cases. If the operation does not conduct sufficient evaluation and 
                                                 
193 Vinck et al., a team of epidemiologists at the UC Berkeley Human Rights Center, present the most 
conclusive evidence, but other authors, including Maedl support this claim. 
194 S/RES/1956 (2010) 12(c). 
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recognize the extent of sexual assault in the eastern Congo it is unlikely to prepare 
adequate mechanisms for curbing the growth rates of the sex crimes that are infused with 
warfare in the DRC. Moreover, the inaccurate reporting serves to discredit peacekeepers 
in the field and delegitimize their efforts to stabilize the country by ignoring grave and 
indecent human rights abuses. Therefore, not only does the discrepancy point to a failure 
in achieving the specific priority laid out in Clause 12(a) of Resolution 1925, but it also 
undermines the broader stability goals of the peacekeeping operation. 
Finally, the thesis also addresses the unsettling fact that mass rapes might have 
been orchestrated, perpetrated, or sanctioned by senior militia commanders. In terms of 
orchestrating or sanctioning sexual violence, Christian Ritscher, the prosecutor who 
indicted senior FDLR leaders Ignace Murwanashyaka, Straton Musoni and Callixte 
Mbarushimana, submitted legal evidence to a German court that demonstrates the men 
approved gang rape as a weapon of war.195 The claim suggests that sexual violence was 
not just approved, but organized and encouraged from the highest echelons of the FDLR 
politico-military chain of command. The Secretary-General also confirmed that militias 
in the eastern regions of the country used rape as a weapon during warfare, specifically 
citing war crimes committed by the FDLR and LRA during 2010.196 More recently, the 
UN Joint Human Rights Office concluded that FARDC officers involved in Operation 
Hatua Yamana had a hand in perpetrating group rapes against as many as 47 women in 
Fizi between December 2010 and January 2011.  
This last finding clearly demonstrates that sexual violence took place during the 
same period of time and in the same region that peacekeepers were deployed to prevent 
its occurrence. It also suggests that a military trained by MONUSCO and operating in 
coordination with the PKO committed egregious acts of sexual violence while in 
proximity to MONUSCO officials. Clearly, the PKO, though well intentioned, did not 
succeed in upholding this element of its mandate. 
                                                 
195 “Rwanda: Ignace Murwanashyaka and Straton Musoni tried,” BBC News, 4 May 2011. 
196 S/2011/20, paras. 45–49. 
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis shows that adequate civilian protection mechanisms have not been 
implemented in the MONUSCO peacekeeping operation. A confluence of factors 
contributed to the failure to establish POC, including a lapse of preventative action from 
peacekeepers, definitional problems surrounding what is actually meant by civilian 
protection, and operational strategies undertaken by the PKO. In order to clarify 
recommendations, it is useful to consider problems of POC implementation separate from 
problems of POC design. 
Problems with implementation include major operational difficulties faced by 
MONUSCO peacekeepers in the field, MONUSCO response times, and, to a lesser 
extent, the trial of international war criminals for crimes committed in the DRC. The 
most systemic implementation failures observed in the PKO resulted from joint 
operations between MONUSCO peacekeepers and FARDC soldiers in Operations Hatua 
Yamana, Kimia II, and Amani Leo. In these instances, peacekeepers overlooked 
atrocities perpetrated against civilians in regions that were supposedly monitored and 
protected by the PKO. They also provided support for FARDC units that committed 
human rights crimes and contributed to internal displacement. 
An additional impediment to implementation was the response time of 
MONUSCO personnel who reacted to crises and triggers of conflict. In instances of 
widespread assaults against non-combatants, such as the Christmas Day Massacres, 
peacekeeping forces did not deploy to prevent or interrupt attacks despite being warned 
of the imminent violence. Joint Protection Teams, introduced to rapidly mitigate conflict 
and stymie outbreaks of conflict in remote eastern provinces took considerable time to 
respond to attacks against civilians. 
In response to these implementation failures, this thesis recommends improving 
response times and increasing the number of peacekeepers and JPTs that are available for 
rapid deployment. The Human Rights Watch, an important advocacy group in the DRC, 
found that financial restrictions and a lack of donor support prevented replication of Joint 
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Protection Teams in the country’s most hostile regions.197 However, JPTs remain one of 
the most agile units in the MONUSCO operation, and the program should be expanded. 
Peacekeepers and associated personnel working in JPTs, especially technical experts, 
must be able to deploy within hours, not days, in order to prevent attacks rather than 
merely record civilian tragedies after they have occurred. Increasing the number of JPTs 
will improve their access to the population by permitting JPT placement at field bases 
throughout the eastern DRC. 
A significant finding of this thesis related to POC design is that a universal 
definition for civilian protection does not exist. No singular standard has been delineated 
by either the Security Council or a legal apparatus within a suitable international 
governing body, namely the UN. In the absence of such a definition, various 
governments, state militaries, and NGOs have individually interpreted the meaning of 
civilian protection. This problem was predicted by Finnemore when she asserted that the 
UN was largely responsible as an international legal body for defining humanitarian 
protection standards in the 21st century. The unwillingness of the institution to determine 
such standards has resulted in one of the most significant impediments to MONUSCO—
and other PKOs—in terms of POC design.  
The lack of a singular understanding has resulted in confusion when 
implementing protocols for civilian protection. Most noticeably, this problem appears 
when Security Council resolutions require peacekeeping operations to undertake POC 
initiatives in their mandates. However, the problem also emerges in multilateral PSOs 
and even unilateral state-building projects. The dilemma is even further exacerbated by 
the fact that PKOs often adopt differing POC definitions for different operations. That is, 
POC in the context of the DRC differs from the mandates that call for POC in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH) and Sudan (UNMIS). Therefore, the most obvious and urgent 
recommendation is for the adoption of an internationally agreed upon definition of 
civilian protection. 
                                                 
197 Simpson, Always on the Run, 9. 
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Both the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Security 
Council should consider universal requirements for a POC definition as these two bodies 
are likely to be the most significant institutional drivers for establishing a common 
terminology. They also have the most operational insight into what elements and actors 
should be included in a definition. These might detail provisions that specifically protect 
women or uphold rights for minority populations. Marginalized groups, which are often 
the easiest civilian targets during conflict, might garner specific attention. In the DRC, 
displaced persons constitute one such group, but minority groups vary widely and it will 
be useful to adopt an open-ended definition of vulnerable populations in conflict 
scenarios. 
Additionally, a singular POC definition must cohere the divergent approaches to 
civilian protection that exist between military agencies and humanitarian organizations. 
As this thesis shows, the gap between these communities leads to problems in 
coordination and misunderstandings in field operations. Task-oriented, securitized 
military components to POC are improved by their civilian counterparts that often offer 
broad protection mechanisms. Similarly, humanitarian approaches to POC inherently rely 
on security provided by military institutions. As Finnemore and other scholars have 
demonstrated, the normative evolution of civilian protection from rudimentary 
conceptions of human rights to international doctrines such as the Responsibility to 
Protect, have narrowed the gap between the military and humanitarian worlds. This 
iterative process has occurred over decades, and is yet to establish a definitive framework 
with implementable practices. A POC definition must utilize common language and 
practices shared by both communities in order to establish such an implementable 
framework. 
Finally, the UN and other bodies could adopt a list of operational measures that 
should be achieved in order to ensure civilian protection. Items from this list would be 
selected when they are pertinent to the specific conflict in which peacekeepers deploy. 
Sexual violence is a good example of an issue that might not have as much relevance in 
other PKOs as it does in the DRC. Civilian casualties and IDPs are frequent phenomena 
that result from conflict, and also drive it; therefore, they might remain important 
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indicators in a range of future operations. Urban guerilla warfare is an indicator that has 
little to no saliency in the DRC but was integral to MINUSTAH operations in Haiti. 
Regardless of the potential to overlook criteria or create an imperfect definition, any 
codified legal and political instrument represents a more unified and constructive 
approach to protecting civilians.  
This thesis contributes to the discourse surrounding civilian protection by positing 
three metrics for evaluating POC implementation in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations. It then analyzes the ability of the MONUSCO mission to address these three 
criteria and draws several lessons from the case study. To date, the MONUSCO operation 
has failed to adequately establish POC standards and the international community lacks 
acceptable POC mechanisms and designs. Nevertheless, positive gains have been made, 
and a compilation of lessons gathered from MONUSCO and similar PKOs will 
strengthen the discourse about protection. As the issue recurs in both Security Council 
resolutions and international media, global organizations and state militaries will take a 
more active role in bolstering POC activities, making it all the more imperative to clarify 
POC terminology and outline operational practices for humanitarian and military 
communities.  
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